Essays on the Conditional Contribution Mechanism for Public Good Provision by Reischmann, Andreas
Essays on the
Conditional Contribution Mechanism
for Public Good Provision
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doctor Rerum Politicarum
An der
Fakulta¨t fu¨r Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universita¨t Heidelberg
vorgelegt von
Andreas Reischmann
Heidelberg, Ma¨rz 2015
To Chloe
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor Jo¨rg Oechssler. Jo¨rg, you managed to
create a work environment based on trust and freedom that made my research possible.
Your advise and your comments were invaluable for my work. Thank you further for
granting me the opportunity to present my papers on international conferences. My
doctorate under your supervision is an experience that I will value for the rest of my live.
Second, I thank the secretary of our department Gabi Rauscher. Gabi, whenever I was
in need of something, when I had any questions, or when I had to hand in bureaucratic
papers, you were always there to help and support me. Your help made my work a
lot easier. Third, I want to thank all members of the department of economics in
Heidelberg as a collective. I enjoyed the extraordinary spirit, the lunch discussions, as
well as our weekly badminton matches immensely. I further thank many members of the
department individually for helpful discussions of my work, the time spent proofreading
my papers, or advise concerning my laboratory experiments. Here I want to mention in
particular Christoph Vanberg, Christoph Brunner, Hannes Koppel, Peter Du¨rsch, Jonas
Hedlund, Holger van Schoor, and Florian Kauffeld. Next I thank the members of the
CDSE in Mannheim for granting me the opportunity to attend their Ph.D. courses. The
knowledge they taught me set the ground that my work is build on. Many thanks also
to Alvin Roth. At the very beginning of my doctorate, during your visit in Heidelberg,
you took your time to discuss my research ideas with me. The experience that the
current Noble price winner in economics was ready to discuss my ideas gave me a boost
of confidence that lasts until now. Finally, I want to thank my family. First, I thank
my parents for helping me become the person that I am. Your education and support
make my success possible. And most of all I thank my own family, my wife Chloe and
our daughter Ella. Chloe, thank you for your unconditional support, for your advise,
for your love. I would not be who I am without you. Ella, thank you for being. You
are just days old, but your were the greatest motivation anyone can have when writing
their thesis.
ii
Contents
Acknowledgments ii
Contents iii
1 The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public
Goods. 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Plan of the paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 The mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Nash equilibria of the BCCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Equilibrium properties of the BCCM under UBRD . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Non-binary Conditional Contribution Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1 The Natural Extension Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.2 The Conditional Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Non-linear valuation functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.6 Summary and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Conditional vs. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism - An Experimen-
tal Study 26
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Environment and mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Theoretical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.1 Contribution rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.2 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Summary and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 The non-binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good
provision. - An Experimental Study. 54
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
iii
Contents iv
3.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1.2 Plan of the paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Environment and mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Theoretical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.2 Single Conditional Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.3 Conditional Contribution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1 Contribution rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.2 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Three ways to improve coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6.1 Possibility I: Use communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.2 Possibility II: Use an extensive-form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.3 Possibility III: Keep gains of previous coordination . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 Summary and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Bibliography 83
Chapter 1
The Conditional Contribution
Mechanism for the Provision of
Public Goods.*
Abstract
Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good environ-
ments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium properties. In
this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods that has good dynamic
properties instead. The mechanism gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribu-
tion on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. Under a reasonable variant of
Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efficient. This makes the mecha-
nism particularly suited for repeated public good environments. In contrast to many previously
suggested mechanisms, it does further not require an institution that has the power to enforce
participation and/or transfer payments. Neither does it use any knowledge of agents preferences.
*I thank the participants of the Game Theory Festival 2013 at Stony Brook University, as well as
the participants of the IWGTS at the University of Sao Paulo. I also thank Alvin Roth, Jo¨rg Oechssler,
Christoph Vanberg, Christoph Brunner, Jonas Hedlund, Thomas Tro¨ger and Hannes Koppel as well as
all participants of the seminars at Heidelberg University for helpful comments.
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1.1 Introduction
Numerous mechanisms have been developed in an attempt to solve the free-rider problem
in public good scenarios. All those mechanisms were developed with a static solution
concept in mind. However, Healy (2006) shows that in repeated public good environ-
ments agents’ actions can be well described by a dynamic better response behavior. This
paper therefore presents a new mechanism that achieves efficient contribution levels un-
der an adjusted better response dynamic. This mechanism is called the Conditional
Contribution Mechanism (CCM).
In the CCM agents can free-ride and contribute unconditionally as in the Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism. Moreover, agents have the possibility to conditionally con-
tribute. In the most simple environment contribution is binary and agents’ utility from
the public good increases linearly with the level of the public good. In this environment
an offer of conditional contribution has the form “I am willing to contribute, if at least
k agents contribute in total“. The mechanism then chooses the highest possible level of
total contribution that satisfies all those conditions.
Under Better Response Dynamics agents switch only to messages with positive proba-
bility that make them weakly better off if nobody else switches as well. In the proposed
mechanism all agents are indifferent between many of their messages. Thus, Better Re-
sponse Dynamics are not sufficiently restrictive for the dynamic process to converge to
any equilibria.
However, the conditional contribution structure of the mechanism makes some better
responses more plausible than others in the long term. Once a certain level of contri-
butions is reached, messages can be separated in two sets. Under the messages in one
set other agents can change the outcome such that the first agent is worse off, but still
has to contribute to the public good. The second set of messages makes sure that in all
outcomes in which the first agent has to contribute he is at least as well off as he is in
the current outcome.
The first kind of messages, which increase other agents incentives to free-ride, shall be
called exploitable. The second kind shall be called unexploitable. The solution concept
used in this paper, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics, assumes that in the long
run agents only choose strategies which are better responses and not exploitable.
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The central result of the binary model is that an outcome is an equilibrium outcome
of the proposed mechanism under Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics if and only
if it is Pareto optimal and a strict Pareto improvement over the outcome with zero
contribution.
The remaining parts of the paper generalize the environment. First, contributions can
now be non-binary. Here the mechanism needs to be adjusted. However, the general idea
of offering agents the options to free-ride, conditionally contribute, and unconditionally
contribute remains unchanged. In this environment the equilibrium results mirror the
results for binary contribution.
Second, the environment is generalized to cover weakly monotonic increasing instead of
linear valuation functions. In this case Pareto optimality will not be enough to ensure
that an outcome is part of a recurrent class. Since utility gained from the public good
no longer increases linearly with the contribution towards the public good, there might
now be coalitions of agents who benefit from reducing their own contributions even if
all other agents then contribute nothing any more. In this environment an outcome is
an outcome of a recurrent class of the mechanism under Unexploitable Better Response
Dynamics if and only if it is in the core and any deviation of a coalition from this
outcome makes at least one agent in that coalition strictly worse off. This holds if at
least one such outcome exists. Existence can be guaranteed by adding only infinitesimal
monetary incentives.
1.1.1 Related literature
This work relates in particular to three branches of the literature. The first one is
given by work on mechanisms to increase contributions to public goods. The earliest
work dates back to Lindahl (1919). However, his pricing system turned out to be not
incentive compatible. The most prominent incentive compatible mechanisms were then
designed by Clarke (1971) and Groves and Ledyard (1977). More recent advances are
the Jackson-Moulin mechanism (Jackson and Moulin, 1992) or the Falkinger mechanism
(Falkinger et al., 2000). However, all those mechanisms have their own draw-backs.
Some e.g. require participation to be enforceable, or a high level of information about
other agents’ preferences to reach the desired equilibrium.
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Second, there are experimental studies on public good provision. For a general survey
I refer to Ledyard (1994), or the more recent surveys of Chen (2008) and Chaudhuri
(2011). Two smaller branches of this literature support the idea that the CCM should
be successful.
First, the studies of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Kocher et al. (2008) show that some
agents have strict preferences for conditional cooperation. I do not use this fact in the
equilibrium analysis. However, it is obvious that preferences for conditional cooperation
make it more likely that agents choose to conditional contribution instead of free-riding.
Second, there are certain papers that compare the performance of the Voluntary Con-
tribution Mechanism (VCM) experimentally to the performance of other simple public
good mechanisms. Two mechanisms have been found to be able to increase contribu-
tions at least in some situations. The auction mechanism by Smith (1979, 1980) and
the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM) studied e.g. in Rondeau et al. (1999, 2005).
Those mechanisms have in common that they use a sharp discontinuity to prevent the
incentives of free-riding. The CCM shares this property of a sharp discontinuity.
In the PPM and the auction mechanism the value of this discontinuity has to be chosen
by the mechanism designer. With a lack of knowledge of agents’ preferences this can
lead to failure of the mechanism to provide any contributions. In the CCM the value of
the discontinuity depends on agents’ messages. Thus, it is no longer exogenously fixed
but can dynamically adjust itself to the optimal value.
The third branch of the literature focuses on Better Response Dynamics in mechanisms.
I already mentioned that Healy (2006) provides experimental evidence that agents’ be-
havior in public good mechanisms can be well described by a better response model.
The importance of Better Response Dynamics in mechanisms is further highlighted by
the recent introduction of Better Response Dynamics into the implementation literature
by Cabrales and Serrano (2011).
1.1.2 Plan of the paper
The remaining sections are structured as follows. In section 1.2, I introduce the Binary
Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) in the simplest possible setting. Valu-
ations are linear and contribution to the public good is binary. Section 1.3 introduces
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Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics and the outcomes of recurrent classes of the
BCCM under UBRD are calculated. Section 1.4 removes the assumption that contribu-
tions are binary and introduces the (non-binary) Conditional Contribution Mechanism.
In Section 1.5, the assumption of linear valuations is replaced with the weaker assump-
tion of weakly increasing valuation functions. Section 1.6 provides a summary and
discussion of the results. Proofs of all theorems can be found in Appendix A.
1.2 The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
I consider a public good environment in the following form. All n ∈ N agents labeled
i are considered to have one monetary unit available in each period, which they can
either keep or invest in one unit of the public good. An outcome is then defined as
z = (z1, ..., zn) with zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I := {1, . . . , n}, where zi = 1 is interpreted as
agent i investing his monetary unit into the public good and zi = 0 represents agent i
keeping his monetary unit for himself. For notational convenience define z = (0, . . . , 0).
Further, all agents i ∈ I have a valuation θi ∈ [0, 1) for the public good.1 Utility of
agent i is then given by a quasilinear utility function of the form
ui = 1− zi + θi
n∑
j=1
zj . (1.1)
Valuations θi are further assumed to be such that some outcome z exists, which is a
strict Pareto improvement over z for all agents i, who contribute in z. This assumption
ensures that some strict improvement over z is possible.2
We do not make any specific assumption on whether agents are informed on the valua-
tions of other agents or not. Nash equilibrium is considered only as a first predictor of
1Values θi < 0 are excluded, since then the public good would be a bad for those agents. If this were
the case a mechanism that does not use transfers can never guarantee Pareto improvements. Thus, the
mechanism proposed in this paper should only be applied if valuations of the public good of all agents
are weakly positive. Values θi ≥ 1 are excluded for simplicity of notation. Any agent with θi ≥ 1 has
a weakly dominant strategy to contribute the entire endowment to the public good. Thus, there is no
need to provide additional incentives to this kind of agents. Therefore, including the possibility of θi ≥ 1
would not lead to a significant change in any results of the paper, but would complicate notation at
several points.
2If this were not the case, any Pareto improvement would rely on some agent’s contribution, who is
indifferent between this Pareto improvement and z. No mechanism with the desired properties can be
asked to provide strict incentives to contribute for this agent in such an environment. Thus, such cases
are not considered in the equilibrium analysis.
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possible dynamically stable outcomes and the main solution concept is a dynamic ad-
justment process. Therefore, the results of this paper apply whenever this adjustment
process describes behavior reasonably well. This might be the case in environments with
complete or incomplete information.
1.2.1 The mechanism
In the Binary Conditional Contribution MechanismGBCCM := (MBCCM , gBCCM ) every
agent can choose a natural number between 1 and n + 1. Thus the message space is
defined as MBCCM =
∏n
i=1M
BCCM
i , with M
BCCM
i := {1, 2, . . . , n + 1}, ∀i ∈ I. The
chosen message is thereby interpreted in the following way: Choosing message mi = k
is like saying “I’m willing to contribute to the public good if at least k agents (including
myself) contribute in total.“ Note that with the messages mi = 1 and mi = n+1 players
can decide to contribute in any or no case, respectively.3
The outcome selected by the mechanism is the outcome with the highest possible level
of contributions such that all those statements are satisfied. Formally, define
K(m) := max
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
1(mi≤k) ≥ k
}
. (1.2)
The outcome of the mechanism is defined as gBCCM (m) = z with zi = 1 if and only if
mi ≤ K(m).4
1.2.2 Nash equilibria of the BCCM
The BCCM has multiple Nash equilibria. An example shall demonstrate what properties
an outcome must have to be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Example 1.1. Consider 5 identical agents with valuation θi = 0.4 ∀ i ∈ I. The trivial
Nash equilibrium is given by mi = 6, ∀ i ∈ I, where no agent contributes to the public
good. However, there are more equilibria as e.g. when agents 1, 2 and 3 choose message
mi = 3 and agents 4 and 5 choose mi = 6. In this case the first three agents will
contribute to the public good: z = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0). The structure of the mechanism makes
3Since there are only n agents, there can never be n+ 1 contributing agents.
4In equation (1.2) 1(mi≤k) denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if mi ≤ k and 0 otherwise.
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this an equilibrium. Agents 4 or 5 can only change the outcome to z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
or z′′ = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) respectively by unilateral deviation. Neither deviation is beneficial.
And the first three agents can only change the outcome to z, which is not beneficial
either. Thus, no agent has any incentive do deviate.
The incentive structure in the example can be generalized. For any outcome there is
a message profile that limits the options of agents to the following ones: Agents that
currently do not contribute can only alter the outcome by unilaterally contributing
themselves, which makes them worse off. Agents that currently contribute can only
change the outcome to z. This indicates that a certain outcome can be implemented
as a Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no agent for which the deviation to z is
profitable.
Theorem 1.1. z is the outcome of a Nash-equilibrium of the BCCM if and only if
z i z, ∀ i ∈ I.
Theorem 1.1 predicts equilibria which are Pareto efficient as well as equilibria which
may not be Pareto efficient such as those equilibria with outcome z. Thus, the Nash
equilibrium concept does not make a clear prediction as to the equilibrium outcome of
the mechanism. Nor does it predict the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes. Therefore,
a suitable refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept is needed.
1.3 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, Better Response Dynamics have been found to de-
scribe agents’ behavior in repeated public good games rather well (Healy, 2006). Thus,
the focus of this section is on Better Response Dynamics as a solution concept. In the
following I demonstrate why simple Better Response Dynamics can not be used for the
proposed mechanisms. And I motivate a variant of Better Response Dynamics that will
be used instead. The intention of this concept is not to perfectly describe subject be-
havior. The purpose is rather to define a dynamic concept that captures all incentives
relevant in the long term. The aim is to correctly predict the set of long term stable
outcomes.
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Better Response Dynamics assume that a mechanism is played repeatedly by the same
agents over a finite or infinite number of periods t. In any period one or more agents
are allowed to adjust their message. Agents deviate with positive probability from their
current message mti to any message m
t+1
i that is a better or best response to m
t. A
recurrent class of such a dynamic concept is a set of message profiles, which if ever
reached by the dynamics is never left and which contains no smaller set with the same
property. If such a recurrent class consists of a single message profile it is called an
absorbing state. The equilibrium outcomes of Better Response Dynamics are defined as
all outcomes of their recurrent classes.
However, when mt−i (the message profile containing the messages of all players but i)
is fixed, all messages in the BCCM of agent i will lead to only two possible outcomes.
This implies that agents will myopically be indifferent between most of their messages. A
dynamic adjustment process that only considers myopic better or best response behavior
will then have the entire strategy space as its only recurrent class. Thus, simple Better
Response Dynamics are not restrictive enough as a solution concept.
I propose to combine the myopic better response condition with a second condition on
behavior that is less myopic. Consider the following example.
Example 1.2. Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Assume
that currently 4 agents contribute to the public good. The message profile could e.g.
be mt = (4, 4, 3, 3, 6). In this case agents 1 through 4 contribute to the public good.
Consider now agent 1. Any message mt+1i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is a better response for agent
i to the message profile mt. None of those messages would change the outcome if no
other agent changes his message at the same time. However, the message mt+11 = 3
gives agent 2 an incentive to deviate to mt+22 = 6 in the following period. Under the new
message profile mt+2 = (3, 6, 3, 3, 6) only agents 1, 3 and 4 would contribute to the public
good making those agents worse and agent 2 better off. The same would be true for the
messages mt+11 = 2 and m
t+1
1 = 1. Messages m
t+1
1 ∈ {1, 2, 3} can thus be exploited by
agent 2 in a later period, making agent 2 better off and agent 1 worse off. The special
structure of the mechanism makes it possible for agents to prevent this kind of incentives
for exploitation without having to free-ride themselves.
From a strategic perspective the exploitable messages in the example provide other
agents with incentives to deviate to less cooperative messages. Thus, not choosing
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those messages can be interpreted like a second order better response behavior. Agents
assume that other agents better respond to the message profile and choose of their own
better responses the ones that are strategically optimal. There are more arguments that
rationalize this behavior. It is easier, however, to provide those arguments once the
term “exploitable“ and with it Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics are precisely
defined.
Definition 1.2. Given a message profile m and an outcome g(m) = z, a deviation from
mi to m
′
i is called exploitable if there is m−i ∈M−i such that z′(m−i) := g(m′i,m−i) ≺i
z and z′i(m−i) > 0. A message m
′
i is called unexploitable if it is not exploitable.
In the following the assumptions of better responding and unexploitability are combined
to one behavioral model.5
Definition 1.3. In Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) all agents can
adjust their message in every period. Agent i switches in period t to message mti with
strictly positive probability if and only if
 mti is a (weak) better response to m
t−1 and
 mti is unexploitable with respect to z
t−1 := gBCCM (mt−1).
Revisit the example from above with this definition in mind.
Example 1.3. Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Let the current
message profile be m = (6, 6, 6, 6, 6). In this case no agent contributes and the outcome
is z. Therefore, a message is exploitable in this case if it makes outcomes possible in
which an agent is worse off than in z. Those messages are only mi = 1 and mi = 2.
Both messages are weakly dominated by mi = 3. Thus, when the current outcome is z a
message is exploitable if and only if it is weakly dominated.
Therefore, unexploitability can be summarized by two assumptions. First, if agents did
not yet coordinate on any Pareto improvements, agents do not send weakly dominated
messages. Second, once agents coordinated on a positive level of contributions, they do
not choose messages that set incentives for other agents to free-ride on their contribution.
5Such a model must further specify whether only one or all agents can change their message in a
given period. The latter seems more reasonable for most applications (e.g. international environmental
agreements). Thus, I assume in the analysis that all agents can adjust their message every period.
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Furthermore, it is not necessary that all agents behave in an unexploitable way. If a
large enough subgroup of agents behaves according to UBRD, while the rest of the agents
is just better responding, the equilibrium outcomes will be as efficient as if all agents
behaved according to UBRD. Consider again an example.
Example 1.4. Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Let the
current message profile be m = (5, 5, 5, 1, 1). In this case only agents 1 through 3 send
an unexploitable message. Nevertheless, neither of the agents can strictly benefit from
any deviation. Although agent 4 and 5’s messages are exploitable any attempt to exploit
those agents would leave only agents 4 and 5 contributing. Thus, total contribution to the
public good would go down by 3. This makes all agents worse off. Thus, in this example
it is sufficient if 60% of agents behave according to UBRD to support full cooperation.
1.3.1 Equilibrium properties of the BCCM under UBRD
Under the stated assumptions agents will learn over time not to choose messages which
make them worse off. And they will learn to choose messages that prevent other agents
from exploiting their contribution offers. Under the combination of those two assump-
tions an outcome is stable if and only if it is Pareto optimal and no agent would be
equally well or better off in z. The rest of the paper uses the following definition to
simplify notation.
Definition 1.4. z′ is a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z if z′ is a Pareto improvement
over z, that is strict for all agents with type θi 6= 0. 6
With this definition I can prove the central result for the binary model.
Theorem 1.5. An outcome z ∈ Z is an outcome of some recurrent class of the BCCM
under UBRD if and only if it is a Pareto optimal outcome and a strict∗ Pareto improve-
ment over z.
Let me again provide an example to improve the intuition for this result:
6Agents who do not profit from the public good (θi = 0) can never be strictly better off than in z.
If those agents are excluded this definition of strict∗ is not necessary. However, the existence of agents
with a valuation of θi = 0 makes many mechanisms, which try to force agents to cooperate, to lead to
outcomes that are not individually rational. It is thus important to include this case to demonstrate
that the BCCM can handle it.
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Example 1.5. Consider a case with 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. The
theorem predicts that all outcomes in which 3,4, or 5 agents contribute to the public good
are outcomes of recurrent classes of the BCCM. Those outcomes have in common that
they are Pareto efficient in a non-transferable utility setting. Assume for example that
the current message profile is m = (4, 4, 4, 4, 6). Then agents 1 through 4 contribute
to the public good, while agent 5 does not. Thus, the outcome is z = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0).
Any deviation of agent 5 would lead to z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and would thus not be a better
response. For agents 1 through 4 messages mi ∈ {5, 6} would lead to the outcome z. They
are thus not better responses either. Messages mi ∈ {1, 2, 3} however make outcomes
possible in which the agent has to contribute, but total contribution is less than 4. Thus,
those messages are exploitable. Therefore, the given message profile is a steady state of
UBRD.7
1.4 Non-binary Conditional Contribution Mechanisms
The environment can be generalized to a setting in which contribution is not binary,
while keeping the mechanism similar. Assume that every agent can invest any amount
between 0 and 1 into the public good. Because it is closer to reality and it keeps the
dynamic analysis simpler, I assume a smallest indivisible monetary unit of 0.01.8
The BCCM can be adjusted to this environment in a very natural way. However, this
natural extension turns out to have equilibria under dynamic considerations, which are
not Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, this failure of the natural extension is an impor-
tant motivation for the more complex message space of the Conditional Contribution
Mechanism, which will be introduced afterwards.
1.4.1 The Natural Extension Mechanism
The natural extension of the BCCM will assign every agent i the message spaceMNEMi :=
{0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99, 1} × {0, 0.01, . . . , n− 0.01, n}, where mi = (αi, βi) is interpreted as “I
am willing to contribute αi to the public good if total contribution is at least βi.“ For the
7In this example the other steady states are given by m′ = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) and m′′ = (3, 3, 3, 6, 6) (in
any permutation)
8This discretization resembles the money structure in most countries. All results in the paper hold
with any other finite discretization as well as with different levels of income.
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analysis in this section I refer to this mechanism as the Natural Extension Mechanism
(NEM). The outcome space is then given by Z := {0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99, 1}n, where zi is
the contribution of agent i to the public good in outcome z. z := (0, . . . , 0) is used as
before as the outcome with no contribution to the public good by anyone. The level of
contribution selected by the mechanism is again the highest level of total contribution
such that all conditions are satisfied. Formally, let ZNEM (m) ⊂ Z be the set of all
outcomes that satisfy all conditions in m. This can be formalized by
z ∈ ZNEM (m)⇔
zi = 0 or zi = αi and n∑
j=1
zj ≥ βi
 , ∀ i ∈ I. (1.3)
It is easy to see that z ∈ ZNEM (m) and z′ ∈ ZNEM (m) imply together
z′′ = (max{z1, z′1}, . . . ,max{zn, z′n}) ∈ ZNEM (m). Thus, the outcome of the mechanism
is uniquely defined by
gNEM (m) = argmaxz∈ZNEM (m)
n∑
i=1
zi. (1.4)
The structure of Nash equilibria is similar to the binary case:
Theorem 1.6. An outcome z is an outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the NEM if and
only if z i z, ∀ i ∈ I.
Revisit the example
Example 1.6. Each of five agents has type θi = 0.4. Assume z = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1).
Then z i z ∀ i ∈ I. This outcome is the outcome of the Nash equilibrium given by
mi = (zi, 1.5). This is a Nash equilibrium since no agent can reduce his contribution
without the outcome becoming z. And neither can any agent by changing his message
increase any other agent’s contribution. Thus, the options for unilateral deviations can
be reduced to the same cases as in the binary model.
Unfortunately, the NEM has undesirable equilibria under UBRD as well. The simplest
way to show this is by considering an example.
Example 1.7. Assume again each of five agents has type θi = 0.4. Assume further
that in period t all agents sent message mti = (0.1, 0.5) and z
t = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1).
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Let us find all unexploitable better responses in period t + 1. Consider w.l.o.g agent 1.
Any message m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 < 0.1 and β1 > α1 will lead to z and is thus not a
better response. Any message m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 < 0.1 and β1 ≤ α1 will lead to z =
(α1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and is thus not a better response, either. Any message m
′
1 = (α1, β1) with
α1 > 0.1 and β1 > 0.4 +α1 will lead to z and is thus not a better response. Any message
m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 > 0.1 and β1 ≤ 0.4 +α1 will lead to z = (α1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) and
is thus not a better response, either. This leaves only messages with α1 = 0.1. However
of those messages the ones with β1 > 0.5 lead to z and are not a better response and
the ones with β1 < 0.5 are exploitable. β1 = 0.3 e.g. could lead after deviations of the
other agents to m′j = (0.05, 0.3), ∀j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} to z′ = (0.1, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05). In
this outcome agent 1 is worse off than in zt but contributes a strictly positive amount.
Thus, his message was exploitable. The only unexploitable better response is thus m′1 =
(0.1, 0.5). This implies that message profile mt is an absorbing state of UBRD. However,
zt = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) is not Pareto optimal.
Agents can in this way get stuck on Pareto improvements over z which are not Pareto
optimal. Any deviation aiming to make further Pareto improvements possible would
make the deviating agent worse off in the next period. And such a deviation is infeasible
under a better response behavior.
This problem can be solved by letting agents announce more than one tuple of the
form (αi, βi). This grants agents a higher flexibility in their strategy giving them the
opportunity to explore Pareto improvements with some tuples, while securing the current
level of cooperation with one other tuple. As it turns out a message of two such tuples is
already enough to solve the issue. Simplicity is a further desirable feature of mechanisms
once practical implementations are considered. Thus, the mechanism I propose in the
following paragraph lets agents announce exactly two tuples.9
9Depending on the application different versions of the mechanism are possible. The more tuples
agents can send, the more flexible they are. Thus, more tuples could lead to faster convergence. However,
more tuples also make the mechanism more complicated. Therefore, a reasonable version for applications
might be to let agents announce any amount of tuples they choose between one and some upper bound.
This gives agents the simple option of choosing one tuple, while also giving them the option to choose
very detailed messages. This mechanism is from the theoretical perspective identical to the version in
the paper. The paper version is chosen since it simplifies notation, especially in proofs.
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1.4.2 The Conditional Contribution Mechanism
I call this mechanism the Conditional Contribution MechanismGCCM := (MCCM , gCCM ).
Every agent can announce two tuples {(α1i , β1i ), (α2i , β2i )} ∈MCCMi := MNEMi ×MNEMi .
The outcome gCCM (m) of the CCM is then defined as in the NEM as the outcome with
the highest level of contribution consistent with the messages chosen. Let ZCCM (m) ⊂ Z
be the set of feasible outcomes for a message profile m:
z ∈ ZCCM (m)⇔ zi = 0 or
∃li ∈ {1, 2} : zi = αlii and
n∑
j=1
zj ≥ βlii
 , ∀ i ∈ I (1.5)
The outcome of the CCM is then uniquely defined by
gCCM (m) = argmaxz∈ZCCM (m)
n∑
i=1
zi.
10 (1.6)
The additional tuple in the message has no effect on Nash equilibrium outcomes, since
only one of the two announced tuples per agent is responsible for the outcome. Such a
mechanism can thus only be found and argued for, when dynamic properties are taken
into consideration. The CCM has indeed the desired positive dynamic properties:
Theorem 1.7. An outcome z ∈ Z is an outcome of some recurrent class of the CCM
under UBRD if and only if it is a Pareto optimal allocation and a strict∗ Pareto im-
provement over z.
An example shall provide some intuition for this result.
Example 1.8. Consider the example with 5 agents. Each agent has type θi = 0.4.
Then in all outcomes of recurrent classes 3 agents contribute their entire endowment.
The two other agents can contribute any amount. Take for example the outcome z =
(1, 1, 1, 0.5, 0.5). This outcome is supported by the messages mi = {(1, 4), (1, 4)} for
i = 1, 2, 3 and mi = {(0.5, 4), (0.5, 4)} for i = 4, 5. The combination of unexploitability
10The outcome can easily be computed by translating the messages of all agents into step-functions,
adding them up and taking the highest fixed point of the resulting function. This makes sure that there
is no problem in computation, when n is large.
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and better responding behavior makes sure that the outcome cannot be left to another out-
come with lower contributions and the unexploitability condition implies further that the
outcome cannot be left to any outcome with higher contributions since either agent 4 or
5 would be worse off than in z. Consider for example the message m′4 = {(0.5, 4), (1, 5)}.
This deviation in itself does not change the outcome, thus it is a better response. How-
ever if agent 5 also switches to m′5 = {(0.5, 4), (1, 5)}, the outcome would change to
z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Since u4/5(z) = 2.1 > 2.0 = u4/5(z′) the messages m′4 and m′5 are
exploitable.11
1.5 Non-linear valuation functions
In this section I drop the assumption that valuations are linear and replace it by a weaker
assumption. Consider a finite number n of agents with quasi-linear utility functions
ui(wi, wp) = wi + fi(wp), where wi is the private wealth of agent i and wp is the total
amount of wealth invested into the public good by all agents. The functions fi are only
assumed to be weakly increasing in the level of the public good and may differ across
agents.12 Endowment and outcome space Z := {0, 0.01, . . . , 1}n remain unchanged.13
In this setting Pareto optimality will not be enough to ensure that an outcome is part
of a recurrent class. Utility gained from the public good increases no longer linearly
with the contribution towards the public good. Therefore, there might now be groups of
agents who benefit from reducing their own contributions even if all other agents would
not contribute anything any more.
In the proofs, I use that the options for deviations of coalitions can be limited to outcomes
in which no agent outside the coalition contributes. I call such outcomes enforceable,
since coalitions cannot force other agents to contribute. When coalitions’ options for
deviations are limited to their enforceable outcomes, the equilibrium outcomes of the
CCM under UBRD can be captured by the core.
11Agents 1 through 3 did not actively exploit the messages of agents 4 and 5 in this example. In some
sense these agents exploited each other. However, the important point is that the deviation from z to
z′ is not desirable for agents 4 and 5.
12Note that this includes the cases of agents not profiting at all from the public good, or who get
satiated at some level.
13A further generalization to different endowments for different agents only complicates notation.
The mechanism can easily be adjusted by enhancing the message space and all main results would be
unaffected.
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Definition 1.8. An outcome z ∈ Z is enforceable for a coalition S ⊂ I if zi = 0 ∀i /∈ S.
The set of all enforceable outcomes for coalition S shall be denoted ZS
As in the case of Pareto efficiency I use a standard definition of the core for games
without transferable utility as e.g. in (Owen, 1982, p. 293).
Definition 1.9. An outcome z ∈ Z is in the core if there is no S ⊂ I, S 6= ∅, and
z′ ∈ ZS , such that z′ i z, ∀ i ∈ S.
Since I already demonstrated that Nash equilibrium does not even uniquely predict the
outcome in the linear case I skip the static analysis and present only the result under
UBRD. As in the previous results there needs to be a strict disincentive for agents to
deviate. Since the outcome space is finite the usual core definition does not guarantee
this.
I therefore need a definition, which is somewhat stronger than the usual core definition
to describe the equilibrium outcomes. Possibilities for deviations under indifference need
to be excluded.
Definition 1.10. A core allocation z is strict∗ for a subset S ⊂ I of agents if for any
enforceable outcome z′ of a coalition S′ with S′ ∩ S 6= ∅ there exists some agent i ∈ S′
with z i z′.
Definition 1.11. Define the subset SC(z) ⊂ I via i ∈ SC(z) if and only if fi(
∑n
i=1 zi) >
0 as the set of agents that strictly benefit from the amount of public good in z.
Theorem 1.12. Assume there exists at least one outcome z that is a core allocation
and strict∗ for SC(z). Then an outcome z′ is an outcome of a recurrent class of the
CCM under UBRD if and only if it is a core allocation that is strict∗ for SC(z′).
If no such outcome exists the result would be a cycling behavior of the dynamics. It
is not obvious that the assumption of existence of such an outcome is satisfied in all
relevant cases. However, the existence problem only exists on an infinitesimal level.
This is shown, by proving that the mechanism can be adjusted to guarantee existence
at arbitrarily low expected costs.14
14Since costs are arbitrarily low I do not want to argue here who should pay those costs. Note though
that in reality costs for setting any such incentives can never be arbitrarily low since the administration
costs will be strictly positive. However, the theorem is not meant to fix the problem in applications,
but rather to show that the problem is likely to have no effect in real applications at all. Note further
that only expected costs can be arbitrarily low as the assumption of a smallest monetary unit makes
arbitrarily low payments only possible as lotteries.
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In the following theorem let ∆ be a mapping from Z × I → R+. The interpretation
is that the mapping defines for any agent and any outcome some expected payment
∆(z, i) := δzi that agent i gets payed if outcome z occurs. I write G + ∆ to describe a
mechanism G to which the additional payments ∆ are added.
Theorem 1.13. For any environment with weakly increasing valuation functions and
for any  > 0 there exists a mapping ∆ such that in the game CCM + ∆ there exists a
core allocation z, which is strict∗ for the subset SC(z). Further, the expected cost of ∆
is less than .
1.6 Summary and discussion
This paper introduces the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms for the pro-
vision of public goods. In these mechanisms agents can condition their contribution
on the total contribution of all agents. There are efficient as well as inefficient Nash
equilibrium outcomes. However, under Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics all
equilibrium outcomes turn out to be Pareto efficient, in the non transferable utility
sense.
A new concept, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics, is introduced in the paper
to predict the outcomes of the mechanisms. Although the concept is close to the stan-
dard concept of Better Response Dynamics and the new unexploitability condition can,
besides other arguments, be related to eliminating weakly dominated strategies, there
always remains some doubt as to the predictive power of a new solution concept. There-
fore, experiments with these mechanisms have to be conducted. A first experiment
with the binary environment shows that the BCCM significantly outperforms the VCM
in terms of contribution rates and Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics is a good
predictor for the stable equilibrium outcomes (Reischmann, 2015b).
Good dynamic equilibrium properties combined with ambiguous Nash equilibrium prop-
erties indicate that the mechanism might only be suited for repeated public good prob-
lems. However, there are a lot of possibilities to adjust the mechanism for a one-shot
game such that the dynamic properties are used. As one example the mechanism could
be played five times with the highest contribution in the five trials being used as the
outcome. This is close to the way in which the auction mechanism studied by Smith
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(1979, 1980) makes coordination possible. Further, agents could be allowed to commu-
nicate prior to the one shot game. This form of cheap talk communication was already
used successfully to increase contributions in a standard VCM public goods game by
Isaac et al. (1985). In the VCM agents have a myopic incentive to lie about the message
they intend to send. In the CCM agents do not have such an incentive to lie, since failed
coordination makes everyone worse off. Thus, communication should work even better
with the CCM. Finding the best way to adjust the mechanism to one shot games is an
interesting question for further research.
Everything considered, the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms is an impor-
tant addition to the set of public good mechanisms. It satisfies individual rationality,
incentive compatibility, and leads under UBRD to Pareto efficient outcomes in repeated
public good environments. Furthermore, in the final analysis the only assumption on
valuations is that they are weakly increasing in the level of the public good. Those weak
assumptions make the mechanism applicable in a wide variety of public good settings.
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Appendix A
General notation: In many proofs I have to show that some outcome z is some sort of
equilibrium. In those proofs I need to distinguish between two subsets of agents. The
subset of agents who contribute to the public good in z, shall be called I1 ⊂ I. And the
subset of agents who do not contribute to the public good in z shall be called I0 ⊂ I. If
I need a second outcome z′ in the proof, those sets will be called I ′1 and I ′0, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let z be an allocation such that no agent strictly prefers z to z
and define k :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then the message profile mi = k ∀i ∈ I1,mi = n+ 1 ∀i ∈ I0 is
a Nash equilibrium with the desired outcome. It is obvious that gBCCM (m) = z. In the
following I show that m is a Nash equilibrium.
If some agent i in I1 deviates to a message m
′
i < k, the outcome does not change. If he
changes his message to some m′i > k, the new outcome will be z. Since no agent strictly
prefers z to z, this can not make agent i strictly better off. Thus agents in I1 have no
strict incentive to deviate.
If some agent j in I0 deviates to m
′
j > k+1, the outcome does not change. If he changes
his message to m′j ≤ k+ 1 he will contribute and total contribution will be k+ 1. Since
θj ∈ [0, 1) this will make him worse off. Thus also the agents in I0 have no incentive to
deviate and m is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Let on the other hand z be an outcome such that any agent i strictly prefers z to z.
Let then m be any message profile leading to the outcome z. By choosing the message
m′i = n + 1 any outcome that might occur is at least as good for agent i as z. Thus i
has an incentive to deviate. Thus m can not be a Nash equilibrium. 2
Proof of Theorem 1.5. I prove the theorem in two steps. In step 1, I show that any
outcome with the described properties is an outcome of a recurrent class of the dynamics.
In step 2, I show that from any other outcome the dynamics reach such a recurrent class
with strictly positive probability.
Step1: In the discussion of the environment I assumed that there exists some Pareto
improvement z over z, which is strict for all i ∈ I1. Such a Pareto improvement is further
strict for all agents i with θi > 0.
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Let z be any such outcome and let k =
∑n
i=1 zi. Then mi = k if and only if i ∈ I1
and mi = n+ 1 if and only if i ∈ I0 is part of a recurrent class of UBRD with outcome
z. I prove this by checking that no deviation to a different outcome is compatible with
UBRD.
For any agent i ∈ I1 deviations to any mi = k′ > k will lead to the outcome z. Since
z is a strict Pareto improvement over z for those agents this is not a better response.
Deviations to any mi = k
′ < k make outcomes possible in which i contributes but total
contribution is less than k. Thus those strategies are exploitable. Thus no agent in I1
will change their message according to UBRD. If only agents in I0 change their messages
total contribution can only increase. No agent i ∈ I0 will choose any mi = k′ < k + 2
since then this agent i would contribute. Since θi ∈ [0, 1) agent i would be worse off.
Thus this is not a better response for agent i.
Assume now that after some deviations of agents i ∈ I0 under UBRD the outcome
nevertheless changes from z to z′. Since z was Pareto optimal at least one agent, call
him j, is worse off in z′ than in z. Since we already noted that no agent in I1 has any
incentive to deviate total contributions are higher in z′ than in z. Thus j ∈ I ′1 or agent
j could not be worse off in z′. This implies that the messages of agent j that made
the change from z to z′ possible was exploitable. Thus, j would not have chosen this
message under UBRD. And z is indeed the outcome of a recurrent class of the UBRD
process.
Step2: Take now any outcome z ∈ Z which is not Pareto optimal or not a strict Pareto
improvement over z for all i with θi > 0. Then I distinguish two cases. In case 1 z is
Pareto optimal but not a strict Pareto improvement over z for all i with θi > 0. Then
there exists some agent i, who contributes, but would be better off by or indifferent to
not contributing even if this will lead to z. Thus for this agent mi = n + 1 is a (weak)
better response. Further mi = n+ 1 can never be exploitable. If all other contributing
agents chose unexploitable messages the switch to mi = n+ 1 will lead to the outcome
z. From z the dynamics reach any recurrent class with Pareto optimal outcome z, which
is a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z, with positive probability. All messages in any
such recurrent class are unexploitable better responses, whenever the current outcome
is z.
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In case 2 z is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a Pareto optimal outcome z′, which
is a Pareto improvement over z. Assume that in z′, k′ agents will contribute. Then
for those agents who contribute in z′ but not in z, mi = k′ is an unexploitable better
response. Once all those agents play mi = k
′, the outcome switches to z′. Thus the
dynamics reach z′ with positive probability. Now z′ is either a Pareto optimum which
is a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z, or we are in case 1. 2
Proof of Theorem 1.6. Let z := (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Z be an outcome, such that z i z ∀ i ∈ I,
and define β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then mi = (zi, β¯) is a Nash-equilibrium of the mechanism with
outcome z. There are four ways in which any agent i can deviate from this message. He
can increase or decrease his proposed contribution. And he can increase or decrease his
condition.
Any decrease in the offered contribution will fail to satisfy all other agents conditions and
can thus only lead to outcomes, which are worse for agent i, no matter what condition
he choses.
Any (weak) increase in the offered contribution will not lead to an increase of other
agents’ contributions. Thus, such an increase combined with a condition that can be
satisfied will only lead to a (weakly) higher contribution by agent i. If the increase in
the offered condition is combined with a condition that can not be satisfied the outcome
will be z. In both cases agent i is (weakly) worse off. Thus, no agent has any incentive
to deviate and m is a Nash equilibrium.
Let now z ∈ Z be an outcome such that some agent i strictly prefers z to z. Given any
message profile m′ leading to the outcome z agent i can profitably deviate to m′′i = (0, 0).
This gives him an outcome which is at least as good as z and thus strictly better than z.
Therefore, there is no message profile that makes z a Nash equilibrium outcome.2
Proof of Theorem 1.7. I prove this theorem in two steps. In step 1 I prove that the
described outcomes are indeed outcomes of recurrent classes of UBRD. And in step 2
I prove that from any other outcome the dynamics reach one of those recurrent classes
with strictly positive probability.
Step1: In the discussion of the environment I assumed that there exists some Pareto
improvement z over z, which is strict for all i ∈ I1. Take then any Pareto optimal
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outcome z′, which is a Pareto improvement over z. Then z′ is a Pareto optimal outcome,
which is strict for all i ∈ I ′1. Assume to the contrary that some i ∈ I ′1 were indifferent
between z′ and z, then his valuation θi must be positive. But then i was either better
off in z than in z′ if i ∈ I0, or he was worse off in z than in z if i ∈ I1. Both possibilities
lead to a contradiction. Note further that any Pareto improvement z over z, which is
strict for all i ∈ I1 is further strict for all agents i with θi > 0.
Thus, there exists a Pareto optimal outcome z ∈ Z, which is a strict Pareto improvement
over z for all agents i with θi > 0. Let z be such an outcome and define β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi.
Then α1i = α
2
i = zi and β
1
i = β
2
i = β¯ is part of a recurrent class of UBRD with outcome
z. Assume to the contrary that after deviations of some agents consistent with UBRD
the outcome changes from z to some z′ 6= z. Note that z′ 6= z implies in this environment
that not all agents are equally well off in z′ as in z. Then at least one agent is worse
off in z′ than in z (otherwise this would be a Pareto improvement over z). If one of
the agents who is worse off contributes in z′ a strictly positive amount then his message
that led to the outcome z′ was either exploitable or no better response and he would
not have chosen it in UBRD. Thus, all agents, who are worse off in z′ than in z, need to
contribute zero in z′. Assume to the contrary that in the group of the other agents who
are equally well or better off in z′ than in z there are some agents who contribute more
in z′ than in z. Then it would be a Pareto improvement over z if those agents made the
contributions as in z′, while all other agents made contributions as in z. This cannot be
the case since z was Pareto optimal. Thus, all agents contribute weakly less in z′ than
in z. This implies that total contributions are lower in z′ than in z. Then there is one
agent in this group whose contribution sank relatively to the contributions in z by the
lowest percentage. If this agent is better off in z′ than in z he would still be better off in
z since the valuation of the public good is linear. This contradicts that z was a strict∗
Pareto improvement over z. This yields a contradiction and thus it is not possible that
the outcome changes under UBRD once the described message profile is reached.
Step2: Assume now that the current outcome z is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists
a Pareto improvement z′ over z such that z′ is Pareto optimal. Define again β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi
and β¯′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i. Then for any agent i the message α
1
i = zi, β
1
i = β¯, α
2
i = z
′
i, β
2
i = β¯
′
is an unexploitable better response to their current message. If all agents choose this
message the outcome will be z′. Thus the dynamics reach this message profile with
strictly positive probability. Once it is reached the new outcome is z′ and now α1i = z
′
i,
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β1i = β¯
′, α2i = z
′
i, β
2
i = β¯
′ is an unexploitable better response for all agents. Thus from
any not Pareto optimal outcome a message profile, like the one in the first part of this
proof, is reached with strictly positive probability.
If z′ is a strict Pareto improvement over z for all agents i with θi > 0 the proof is
complete. If it is not, then there exists some agent i ∈ I ′1 who is at least as well off in z
as in z′. For this agent the message α1i = 0, β
1
i = 0, α
2
i = 0, β
2
i = 0 in an unexploitable
better response. Thus the dynamics move from any Pareto optimum like z′ to z with
positive probability. From z any Pareto optimal allocation, which is a strict∗ Pareto
improvement over z, is reached with positive probability in the way described above.
2
Proof of Theorem 1.12. In the first part of the proof I show that any core outcome z,
which is strict∗ for SC(z), is an outcome of recurrent classes of the dynamics.
Let z be an outcome of the mechanism and let z be a core allocation, which is strict* for
SC(z). Define β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then α
1
i = α
2
i = zi and β
1
i = β
2
i = β¯ is part of a recurrent
class of UBRD with outcome z. Assume to the contrary that after deviations of some
agents consistent with UBRD the outcome changes to some z′ 6= z. Then at least one
agent i ∈ I ′1 is worse off in z′ than in z (otherwise this would be a coalition improvement
over z). Agent i’s message, which led to the outcome z′, was thus either exploitable or
no better response and he would not have chosen it in UBRD.
In the second part of the proof I show that from all other allocations the dynamics move
with strictly positive probability to a core allocation, which is strict∗ for SC(z).
Assume that the dynamics are in a state with some outcome z, which is not Pareto
optimal and let z′ be any Pareto optimal allocation, which is a Pareto improvement
over z. Define β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi and β¯
′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i. Then the message (zi, β¯), (z
′
i, β¯
′) is an
unexploitable better response for any agent i. Thus the dynamics move with strictly
positive probability from z to any such z′.
I can thus assume that the dynamics are in a state with some outcome z, which is Pareto
optimal, but not a core outcome that is strict for SC(z). Then there exists a coalition
S and an outcome z′ ∈ ZS such that all agents i ∈ I ′1 are at least as well off in z′
than in z. This implies that β¯′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i < β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi or this would be a Pareto
improvement. Then in a first step the messages (zi, β¯), (z
′
i, β¯
′) are unexploitable better
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responses for every agent i ∈ I ′1. Once all agents i ∈ I ′1 switched to those messages,
the messages (z′i, β¯
′), (z′i, β¯
′) and (zi, β¯), (zi, β¯) are both unexploitable better responses
for those agents, since the current outcome is still z. But if now simultaneously one
agent chooses (z′i, β¯
′), (z′i, β¯
′) and another one chooses (zj , β¯), (zj , β¯), then contribution
breaks down entirely and the outcome will be z. From z any core allocation, which is a
Pareto improvement over z and strict∗ for SC(z) will be reached with strictly positive
probability in the way described above. 2
Proof of theorem 1.13. I prove this theorem in two steps. In step 1, I show that it is
possible to design arbitrarily cheap incentive schemes, such that no agent is indifferent
between any two outcomes. In step 2, I show that this leads to the existence of a core
outcome in the given environment. Finally, when every agent has a strict preference
between any two outcomes then any core outcome is strict∗ for all subsets of agents.
Thus, there exists a core outcome z, which is strict for SC(z).
Step 1: Let  > 0. Define ′ := mini∈I minz,z′∈Z:ui(z)6=ui(z′) |ui(z) − ui(z′)| as the
smallest positive difference in utility between any two outcomes for any agent. Let
NZ := #Z be the number of possible outcomes and let r : Z → {1, ..., NZ} be any bi-
jective mapping, which satisfies
∑n
i=1 zi >
∑n
i=1 z
′
i ⇒ r(z) > r(z′). Define the mapping
∆zi =
r(z)min(,′)
2nNZ
∀ i ∈ I. Total cost of this mapping can be estimated in the following
way:
n∑
i
∆zi =
n∑
i
r(z) min(, ′)
2nNZ
≤
n∑
i
NZ min(, 
′)
2nNZ
≤ nmin(, 
′)
2n
≤ 
2
(1.7)
Thus the mapping has total cost of at most 2 . Assume now to the contrary that some
agent i is indifferent between any two outcomes z and z′ under the mechanism with the
incentive scheme ∆. This indifference implies:
ui(z) + ∆zi = ui(z
′) + ∆z′i ⇔ ui(z)− ui(z′) = ∆z′i −∆zi (1.8)
The absolute value of the left-hand side of this equation is either equal to zero or weakly
bigger than ′. However, since r(z) 6= r(z′) the absolute value of the right-hand side
is strictly bigger than zero and strictly smaller than ′. This leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, adding the incentive scheme ∆ leads to a mechanism in which no agent is
indifferent between any two outcomes.
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Step 2: I prove this step by induction over the number of agents in the economy. For the
beginning assume there are n = 1 agents. Then existence of a core outcome is equivalent
to the existence of an outcome which gives the agent maximal utility. Since our state
space is finite this is trivial. Thus, one may assume that for an economy with n = k
agents there exists a core outcome. Let’s now look at an economy with n = k+1 agents.
Call the coalition of agents 1 through k in this economy C. Then by assumption there is
an outcome z, with zk+1 = 0, from which no subcoalition of C can improve. I call this a
core outcome in the coalition C. Let z′ be the Pareto optimal Pareto improvement over z,
in which agent k+1 gets the highest utility. Then no subcoalition of C can improve on z′.
Otherwise z could not have been a core outcome in coalition C. Assume to the contrary
a coalition C ′ including agent k + 1 can improve from z′ to an outcome z′′. Then total
contributions are less in z′′ than in z′ or this would be a further Pareto improvement.
Then z′′′ := (max{z1, z′′1}, ...,max{zk, z′′k}, z′′k+1) is a Pareto improvement over z in which
agent k + 1 is better off than in z′′ (since
∑n
i=1 zi >
∑n
i=1 z
′
i ⇒ r(z) > r(z′)) and thus
better off than in z′. This contradicts the assumptions on z′. Thus, no coalition can
improve on z′ and therefore z′ is in the core.2
Chapter 2
Conditional vs. Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism
An Experimental Study *
Abstract
The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision gives all agents the possi-
bility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents.
In this experimental study the mechanism’s performance is compared to the performance of the
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. In an environment with binary contribution and linear val-
uations subjects play the mechanisms in a repeated setting. The mechanisms are compared in
one case of complete information and homogeneous valuations and in a second case with hetero-
geneous valuations and incomplete information. In both cases a significantly higher contribution
rate can be observed when the Conditional Contribution Mechanism is used.
*I thank the participants of the IWGTS at the University of Sao Paulo. I also thank Jo¨rg Oechssler,
Peter Du¨rsch, Florian Kauffeld, Hannes Koppel, Christoph Brunner, Jonas Hedlund and Christoph
Vanberg as well as all participants of the seminars at Heidelberg University for helpful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
Numerous attempts have been made to solve the free-rider problem in public good en-
vironments. While there are many complex mechanisms that have good theoretical
properties, it is exactly this complexity that makes them difficult to apply in practical
applications. However, the simple mechanisms which are mostly used, like e.g. the Vol-
untary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), do not have good theoretical properties and
suffer, at least to some extent, from the free-rider problem. With the recent develop-
ment of the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) there is a new simple
candidate to solve the free-rider problem (Reischmann, 2015a). This paper presents the
first experimental evidence on the performance of the BCCM.
This special case of the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms (CCMs) is appli-
cable in binary contribution environments. It extends the message space of the VCM
{”Contribute”, ”Don’t Contribute”} by conditional contribution offers of the form ”Con-
tribute only if at least k other agents contribute as well”. The mechanism is played
simultaneously by all agents. When there are multiple outcomes that satisfy all condi-
tions, the mechanism selects of these outcomes the one with the largest amount of total
contributions.
The CCMs are designed with a focus on dynamic properties. Thus, the static equilib-
rium properties are not very impressive. The CCMs have many efficient, but also many
inefficient Nash equilibria. However, Reischmann (2015a) applies a variant of Better Re-
sponse Dynamics under which all outcomes of dynamic steady states are Pareto efficient.
Since Healy (2006) shows that Better Response Dynamics describe subject behavior in
public good games rather well, the BCCM is well suited for repeated public good envi-
ronments.
The aim of this experimental study is to evaluate whether the BCCM is a suitable candi-
date to solve the free-rider problem. For this sake, I compare the BCCM with the VCM.
The VCM is chosen as a comparison since it is, besides the Provision Point Mechanism
(PPM), the only mechanism that is regularly applied in practical applications. Further
the PPM is better suited for step-level public goods, which are not the focus of this
study. Thus, the VCM is still the most important benchmark to beat.
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Both the VCM and the BCCM are tested in two repeated public good environments,
one with complete and one with incomplete information. In both treatments I find the
effect, that the BCCM produces significantly higher contribution rates than the VCM.
As expected from the theoretical analysis the difference in contribution rates is mainly
found in the last 10 periods. This result supports the theoretical prediction that the
BCCM sets better dynamic incentives in repeated public good environments than the
VCM.
2.1.1 Related literature
My work mostly relates to two kinds of literature, first experiments comparing the per-
formance of two or more public good mechanisms and second experimental studies on
behavior in public good mechanisms in general, or the Voluntary Contribution Mecha-
nism in particular.
Smith (1979, 1980) compares his auction mechanism to the VCM and a quasi-free-rider
mechanism. All three mechanisms have in addition an unanimity rule. If an outcome
is not unanimously accepted no contribution will be made to the public good. Smith
finds that the auction mechanism supplies significantly higher levels of the public good
as the free rider quantity. However, if the cases when unanimity fails are taken into
account the auction mechanism does not perform significantly better than the alternative
mechanisms. Banks et al. (1988) continue the investigation of the auction mechanism and
compare it to the VCM. They compare both mechanisms with and without unanimity.
They find that the auction mechanism is more efficient than voluntary contribution.
Unanimity seems to lower contributions overall.
There are multiple studies comparing the VCM with a Provision Point Mechanism
(PPM). Rondeau et al. (1999) show that under specific conditions the PPM can be
demand revealing. Building on this Rondeau et al. (2005) find that the PPM leads in
a lab and a field experiment to a higher willingness to contribute to the public good
than the VCM. Rose et al. (2002) further study the PPM in a field experiment on green
energy and find that contribution rates outperform previous studies that used the VCM.
However, every contribution in the VCM can definitely be used to finance a certain level
of the public good. Contributions under the PPM might be lost for the public good if
the threshold for provision was chosen too high.
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Further mechanisms that have recently been tested experimentally are auction and lot-
tery mechanisms. Schram and Onderstal (2009) compare a first-price winner-pay auc-
tion, a first-price all-pay auction and a lottery. They find that out of those three mecha-
nisms the all-pay auction leads to significantly higher contributions. Morgan and Sefton
(2000) present an experiment in which a lottery leads to higher contribution to a public
good than the VCM. They further find that higher price money leads to a more effective
mechanism. Contrary to the findings of Schram and Onderstal (2009), Corazzini et al.
(2010) show an experiment in which a lottery outperforms an all-pay auction. Still in
their experiment both mechanisms fare better than the VCM.
Behavior in public good environments under the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism is
very well understood. Early experiments find consistently that contribution rates are
around half-way between the efficient and the free-rider quantity in one-shot games.
Under repeated interaction these contributions decline over time. See Ledyard (1994)
for a survey on this branch of the literature. The more recent experiment by Burger
and Kolstad (2009) covers VCM treatments with binary contributions and they find
results in the same spirit, medium contribution rates in the first period and a decline of
contributions over time.
By now economic theory can explain these findings that contradict the strong free-
rider hypothesis. One explanation is given by social preferences, as e.g. the model of
inequality aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Another explanation are preferences
for conditional cooperation as found by Fischbacher et al. (2001). In combination with
the finding of Healy (2006) that agents better respond in public good environments this
explains positive contributions in the first period as well as the decline over time.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the two mechanisms
that will be covered in the experiment. In section 2.3, there is a short theoretical analysis
of the equilibrium properties of those mechanisms. Section 2.4 covers the description of
the experimental setup, while section 2.5 presents the results. Finally, section 2.6 gives
a short summary and discussion of the paper. Translations of written instructions and
test questions handed out to subjects in the experiment can be found in Appendix B
and C.
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2.2 Environment and mechanisms
In this experimental study I compare two different mechanisms. Both mechanisms are
tested in an environment with five agents. Those agents play one of the mechanisms as
a stage game repeated over 20 periods. In every period the agents are endowed with 10
points.1 Those points can be invested in a group project or be kept in the private account.
The points can not be divided between the two options, so contribution is binary. In the
following section an outcome is going to be described by z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5). zi = 0
denotes that agent i does not invest his points into the project and zi = 10 implies that
he does invest his points into the project.
The two mechanisms are compared in two different cases. One case with complete
information and homogeneous valuations and one with incomplete information and het-
erogeneous valuations. Comparisons between the two cases with the same mechanism
are not the focus of this study.
In the complete information case every agent knows all players’ valuations for the public
good and valuations are homogeneous with θi = 0.6. In the incomplete information
case agents only know their own valuation and all agents have a valuation of θi = 0
with a probability of 20% and a valuation of θi = 0.6 with probability of 80%. Thus,
heterogeneous valuations are possible. The first type of agents, who do not benefit from
the public good, are called type 1 agents. And agents, who do benefit, are called type
2 agents. The draws of valuations for group members are independent. Every draw is
used though for one group with each mechanism to ensure comparability. Given their
valuation agents have the following payoff function:
Πi = 10− zi + θi
5∑
j=1
zj (2.1)
In the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) agents can condition their
contribution on a total level of contribution provided by all agents. The message space
is given by Mi = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Message mi = k can be interpreted as saying ”I’m
willing to contribute to the public good if at least k other agents contribute as well.”
Message mi = 0 is equivalent to contributing in any case. And the message mi = 5
110 points are chosen to ensure that the number of points earned in each period is a natural number
in all cases.
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is equivalent to contributing in no case.2 An offer for conditional contribution can be
satisfied it two ways. Either the agent does not have to contribute. Or his condition for
contribution is satisfied. This implies that for a given message profile m there might be
more than one outcome z that satisfies all conditional contribution offers. Of all those
outcomes the BCCM selects the one with the highest total level of contribution. This
can be formalized by using the following help variable:
K(m) := max
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
1(mi<k) ≥ k
}
, (2.2)
where 1(mi<k) denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if mi < k and 0 otherwise.
With this variable, the outcome of the mechanism can be defined as gBCCM (m) = z
with zi = 10 if and only if mi < K(m).
Example 2.1. Consider the following examples. If all agents choose mi = 5, no agent
contributes to the public good. If all agents choose mi = 4, there are two outcomes that
satisfy all conditions. In the outcome z = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10) all agents contribute to the
public good. And in the outcome z = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) no agent contributes to the public good.
Therefore, the BCCM selects the first outcome and all agents will have to contribute.
Similarly if e.g. m1 = m2 = m3 = 2, m4 = 4, m5 = 5, then agents 1, 2 and 3 will
contribute to the public good.
The mechanism that I use as a benchmark is a standard binary Voluntary Contribu-
tion Mechanism (VCM). In this mechanism agents have only two options. They can
contribute in any case or free-ride in any case.
2.3 Theoretical predictions
For an extensive analysis of the theoretical predictions of the general Conditional Contri-
bution Mechanisms I refer to the companion paper (Reischmann, 2015a). Here I analyze
the predictions for the specific versions of the mechanisms used in the experiments.
Two different solution concepts will be considered. The first one is Nash equilibrium,
since it is the most standard concept and it provides intuition about what might be
2Since there are only 5 agents in total, there can never be more than four other contributing agents.
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stable outcomes of the mechanisms. The second one is Unexploitable Better Response
Dynamics. This is a variant of Better Response Dynamics which is developed and
motivated in the companion paper mentioned above.3 The definition is as follows:
Definition 2.1. Given a message profile m and an outcome g(m) = z, a deviation
from mi to m
′
i is called exploitable if there exists m−i ∈ M−i such that z′(m−i) :=
g(m′i,m−i) ≺i z and z′i(m−i) > 0. A message m′i is called unexploitable, if it is not
exploitable.
Definition 2.2. In Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) all agents can
adjust their message in every period. Agent i switches in period t to message mti with
strictly positive probability if and only if
 mti is a (weak) better response to m
t−1 and
 mti is unexploitable with respect to z
t−1 := g(mt−1).
Summarizing the motivation given in Reischmann (2015a), UBRD makes the following
two assumptions on long term incentives. First, in the long term agents do not choose
messages that make them worse off immediately. This is captured by the better response
condition. Second, agents do not choose messages that make outcomes possible, in which
the agent has to contribute to the public good, but is worse off than in the current
outcome. This is captured by the unexploitability condition.
Since this is an experimental study, the experimental results will present a good oppor-
tunity to evaluate the validity of this concept. Thus, the discussion whether UBRD is
a reasonable solution concept for this mechanism is postponed to section 2.5, where the
experimental results are discussed.
2.3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism gives every agent the choice whether he wants
to contribute to the public good. And no agent has any influence over any other agent’s
contribution. Disregarding social preferences, it is easy to see, and well known in the
3UBRD is only supposed to capture all relevant long term incentives of the Conditional Contribution
Mechanisms. Thus, the concept wants to make a good prediction about what outcomes occur in dynam-
ically stable states of the CCM. The concept is not intended to describe agents short term behavior in
detail. Nor is it intended to be applicable to other mechanisms.
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literature, that free-riding is a dominant strategy here. This is true for all agents with
a valuation θi < 1. The straight forward Nash prediction, not taking possible social
preferences into account, is thus that all agents will free-ride. Since free-riding is a
strictly dominant strategy any refinement of Better Response Dynamics will also predict
this outcome as a unique steady state.
However, it is equally well known that this theoretical prediction is seldom to never
observed in experiments. Indeed the general observation is a contribution rate of about
40-60% of the efficient level in the first period. If the public good game is played re-
peatedly, as it is in this study, the typical experimental finding is that contribution rates
decline over time. Social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as well as preferences
for conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001) in combination with a better re-
sponding behavior (Healy, 2006) explain these findings well. Since those findings are
very persistent (see Ledyard (1994) for a survey of the early findings and Burger and
Kolstad (2009) for a recent example with the binary VCM), this is also what I expect
to find in this experiment.
2.3.2 Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
Reischmann (2015a) proves that any outcome of the BCCM is the outcome of a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a weak Pareto improvement over z := (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). This
is easy to see for the specific case considered in the experiment. Consider the outcome
z = (10, 10, 10, 0, 0) in the complete information treatment (θi = 0.6 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 5).
This is a Pareto improvement over z. One Nash equilibrium that leads to this outcome
is given by m1 = m2 = m3 = 2, m4 = m5 = 5. All other Pareto improvements z over
z are supported as Nash equilibrium in similar fashion. Agents who contribute in z
condition their contribution on the total level of contribution in z and all other agents
choose to contribute in no case.
Thus, the Nash prediction in the homogeneous case would be that either none, two, three,
four, or all five subjects contribute in any group. This, of course, is no useful prediction
since it only excludes outcomes in which one subject contributes alone. Unexploitable
Better Response Dynamics, however, predict convergence to either an outcome in which
all five subjects contribute (m = (4, 4, 4, 4, 4)), or an outcome in which four agents
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contribute (m = (3, 3, 3, 3, 5), in any permutation). Note that these are exactly the
outcomes which are Pareto efficient in a non-transferable utility framework.
The formal proof that the stable outcomes of the BCCM under UBRD coincide with the
Pareto efficient allocations, which are Pareto improvements over z, can again be found
in the companion paper. Here I provide some intuition with another example.
Example 2.2. Assume that the current message profile is m = (3, 3, 3, 3, 5). In this
case only agent 5 does not contribute to the public good. Thus, the outcome is z =
(10, 10, 10, 10, 0). Any deviation of agent 5 will lead to an outcome in which he has to
contribute to the public good. This would not be a better response. If any one of agents
1 through 4 switches to a message mi ∈ {4, 5} the outcome would be z. Those messages
are not better responses either. Any message mi ∈ {0, 1, 2} violates the unexploitability
condition since it makes outcomes possible in which the agent must contribute but is
worse off than in the current outcome. Take e.g. m1 = 2. This makes the message profile
m = (2, 2, 2, 5, 5) possible. In this profile agent 1 has to contribute and total contributions
are lower than in the other outcome. Thus, the message profile m = (3, 3, 3, 3, 5) is one
steady state of UBRD.
The next example demonstrates why outcomes that are not Pareto efficient can not be
steady states of UBRD.
Example 2.3. Assume that the current message profile is m = (2, 2, 2, 5, 5). In this case
agents 1,2 and 3 contribute to the public good. Thus, the outcome is z = (10, 10, 10, 0, 0).
No agent can directly benefit from any deviation. Thus, the message profile m is a Nash
equilibrium. However, agents 4 and 5 can deviate to the message mi = 4. One such
deviation does not change the outcome and a unilateral deviation is thus a weak better
response. Further, agents 4 and 5 will only have to contribute to the public good if the
outcome will be z′ = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10). Agents 4 and 5 are both better off in z′ than in
z. Thus, the message mi = 4 is unexploitable. However, if both agents 4 and 5 switch
to mi = 4 the outcome will indeed be z
′. Therefore, m is not a steady state of UBRD.
The equilibria in the incomplete information treatment mirror the results of the com-
plete information case. Since the dynamics only consider the heterogeneity part of the
incomplete information treatment this is not surprising. Thus, in this treatment either
all or all but one type 2 agents are predicted to contribute. Still, all outcomes of steady
states are Pareto efficient.
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2.4 Experimental design
The experiments were conducted at the Alfred-Weber Institute of Heidelberg University.
The subject pool used for recruiting consists mainly of students. In each session 10,
15 or 20 subjects participated in groups of 5. In total 195 subjects took part in the
experiments. Seven groups played the VCM with complete information and eight groups
played the BCCM with complete information. In the incomplete information treatment
each mechanism was played by 12 groups. Sessions lasted between 45 minutes and one
hour.
When the subjects entered the lab they were randomly allocated to their seats by draw-
ing numbered cards. Every subject was then handed one set of instructions and test
questions. English translations of the instructions and test questions can be found in
Appendix B and C. Once all subjects answered the test questions correctly and there
were no more questions a computer program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was
started. The program randomly matched subjects in groups of 5. Groups stayed the
same over all 20 periods. Every group played only one mechanism and only one infor-
mation treatment. In the incomplete information treatment the random draw of types
was performed by the program at the beginning of period one.
After the last period there was a short questionnaire asking for personal characteristics
such as gender and previous knowledge of game theory. Afterwards subjects were called
by seat number to receive their payoff in private. In every period subjects could earn
between 6 and 30 points. Points of all periods were added up. Subjects were payed 1¤
for every 40 points. Type 1 subjects in the incomplete information treatment received an
additional 5¤ to compensate them for the lower earning possibilities. Average earnings
per subject were 11.55¤.
2.5 Experimental results
This study intends to answer two questions. First, is the BCCM suited to improve
contribution rates to public goods compared to the VCM? Second, is the model of UBRD
suited to predict long term stable outcomes of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms?
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2.5.1 Contribution rates
Whether or not the BCCM can increase contributions to the public good significantly
compared to the VCM is the primary question. Therefore, I compare total contributions
in groups under the BCCM to those contributions under the VCM using the Wilcoxon-
Rank-Sum Test. In each group I take the average of total contributions over a certain
number of periods. First, I consider all periods to get an impression of the total effect.
Second, I only consider the last 10 periods, to get an impression of the long term effect,
once a certain level of convergence has taken place including the endgame effect. Third,
I consider periods 9 to 18. This choice makes it possible to look at the long term effects
excluding the end game effect.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of average contributions over all groups in the complete
information treatment.
Average contributions per period over all groups with complete information are displayed
in figure 2.1. The figure makes the following immediate observations possible. First, the
contribution rate in the first period under the VCM is surprisingly high. The reason
for this is probably the binary contribution environment in combination with the rather
small group size of 5. Second, contributions in the VCM decline over time as expected.
Third, contribution rates in the BCCM are similar to the VCM in early periods but much
higher in the later periods. Fourth, the BCCM does, in this treatment, not suffer from
any endgame effect. All these observations support the theoretical prediction that the
BCCM has better dynamic properties than the VCM. In fact the BCCM leads already to
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of average contributions over all groups in the incomplete
information treatment.
Figure 2.3: Comparison of average contributions over all groups with at least one
type 1 agent.
significantly higher contributions when all periods are taken into account (p = 0.0425).
When only the last 10 periods are considered the effect is highly significant (p = 0.0080).
And when I exclude the endgame effect (periods 9 to 18) the results are still significant
(p = 0.0388).
In the incomplete information treatment type 1 agents have a dominant strategy to free-
ride. Besides a few mistakes in period 1 and one mistake in period 2 all subjects also
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chose this strategy. Therefore, contribution rates in the incomplete information treat-
ments are always compared in terms of average contributions of type 2 agents. Average
contributions of type 2 agents per period over all groups with incomplete information
are displayed in figure 2.2. The observations from this figure differ from the complete in-
formation case in only one way. Under incomplete information the BCCM suffers from a
severe endgame effect. There are two reasons for this. Some agents harm themselves by
deviating because they try to free-ride in a coordinated equilibrium resulting in a com-
plete breakdown of contributions. My only explanation for this behavior is that some
agents make mistakes, because of the somewhat higher complexity of the incomplete
information treatment. The second reason is that some groups reach Pareto efficient
outcomes, but no stable equilibrium by period 20. This creates incentives for individual
agents to deviate. However, more than one deviation usually leads again to a complete
breakdown. This makes the endgame effect even bigger than in the VCM treatments.
This second effect might vanish when more periods are played, which gives subjects
more time to converge to stable equilibria. Besides this point, however, the results are
very similar. The increase in contributions when all periods are considered is at least
weakly significant (p = 0.0602). For the last 10 periods results are again significant at
the 1% level with a p-value of p = 0.0078. And when the last two periods are excluded
the increase is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0199).
Figure 2.3 shows the average contribution rates when in the incomplete information
treatments only those groups are considered that contain at least one type 1 agent.
This leads to lower contribution rates under both mechanisms in the first half of the
experiment. However, groups playing the BCCM manage to achieve the same high
contribution rates in periods 10 to 19. Groups playing the VCM however can not stop
the decline of contributions. This observation strengthens the impression that the BCCM
robustly reaches high long term contribution rates even in settings in which coordination
in the early periods is difficult.
Result 2.3. Under complete as well as under incomplete information the Binary Con-
ditional Contribution Mechanism leads to higher contribution rates than the Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism.
The theoretical analysis further suggests that the BCCM should be able to reach stable
equilibria with high contribution levels. If this is true it should not be possible to find
a decrease in contributions over time as has repeatedly been shown for the VCM. In
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fact since failed coordination in the early periods might lead to low contribution rates in
those periods the BCCM might lead to an increase of contributions over time. Therefore
a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Rank Test is used to compare average contribution
rates over the first 10 periods with those over the last 10 periods.
In both treatments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism contributions in the
first 10 periods are significantly higher than in the last 10 periods. The p-values are
given by p = 0.0343 for complete information and p = 0.0022 for incomplete information.
In the BCCM treatments on the other hand I observe higher contribution rates in the last
10 than in the first 10 periods under complete information with a p-value of p = 0.0193.
And under incomplete information the hypothesis that contribution rates in the first
and last 10 periods are equal can not be rejected (p = 0.3668).
Result 2.4. In treatments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism contributions
decrease over time. In treatments with the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
this is not the case. Under complete information contribution rates are even increasing.
One typical goal of the implementation problem is that the designed mechanism should
lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. Whether the BCCM leads to Pareto efficient outcomes
can only be answered qualitatively. In the case of complete information when all periods
are considered 91.88% of outcomes are Pareto efficient. When only the last 10 periods
are taken into account 96.25% of outcomes are efficient. And in the last 4 periods every
single outcome is Pareto efficient. Note again that Pareto efficiency is considered without
the possibility of transfer payments. Thus, an outcome is Pareto efficient if four or five
agents contribute to the public good.
While the theoretical prediction of Pareto efficient outcomes fits the data well in the
complete information case the situation differs under incomplete information. In those
treatments 75.42% of all outcomes under the BCCM are Pareto efficient. This number
increases slightly to 80.83% in the last 10 periods, but decreses again to 75% in the last
4 periods, because of the endgame effect under incomplete information.
Result 2.5. Under complete information the Binary Conditional Contribution Mecha-
nism converges to Pareto efficient outcomes. Under incomplete information about 3 out
of 4 outcomes are Pareto efficient.
Chapter 2. BCCM vs. VCM - A binary contribution experiment 40
2.5.2 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics
Finally, I am interested in the model of Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics it-
self. How well does the model fit the data for the Binary Conditional Contribution
Mechanism?
Note first that the model of better responding agents fits the data pretty well. In the
complete information treatment about 93% of messages sent are better responses. In
the incomplete information treatment the value is even a little bit higher at 96%, both
times high enough to claim that a better responding behavior describes the observations
reasonably well. However, only around half of all messages are also unexploitable bet-
ter responses in the two treatments (41% under complete and 53% under incomplete
information).
There is no support for a theory that agents learn to choose unexploitable messages over
time under incomplete information (52% of messages are unexploitable better responses
in the last ten and 53% in the last 5 periods). And only weak support for a learning
towards unexploitablity under complete information (35% in the last ten and 47% in
the last 5 periods).
However, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics is only intended as a concept that
predicts long term stable outcomes. As such UBRD predicts that the long term stable
outcomes are the Pareto efficient outcomes. If the dynamics are considered to have
converged to a stable outcome if at least four out of the last five outcomes are identical
then, 14 out of 20 groups converge to an outcome. Of those 14 outcomes all 14 are Pareto
efficient. This supports the conclusion that UBRD predicts the dynamically stable
outcomes of the BCCM correctly. In comparison, under the definition of convergence
from above, 8 out of 19 groups under the VCM reach a stable outcome. Of those 8
outcomes 4 are Pareto efficient and 4 are not Pareto efficient.
2.6 Summary and discussion
In this work an experiment was conducted with the aim to test the performance of the
Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) for public good provision. Since
this is the first test a simple binary contribution environment with linear valuations is
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chosen. In the experiment the BCCM is compared to the standard Voluntary Contribu-
tion Mechanism in one setting with complete and one with incomplete information.
In all settings the BCCM leads to significantly higher contribution rates than the VCM.
This effect is especially large if only the second half of the experiment is considered.
In those periods convergence in many groups of the BCCM is complete and average
contribution rates are rather stable at 93% (complete information) or 81% (incomplete
information). By comparison, average contribution rates over the same periods under
the VCM are 60% (complete information) and 53% (incomplete information). Another
important difference between the mechanisms is that in groups playing the BCCM no
decline of contributions over time can be observed.
This experiment further gives support for the dynamic model Unexploitable Better Re-
sponse Dynamics designed in Reischmann (2015a). The model gives an accurate predic-
tion of the long term stable outcomes of the BCCM in the test environment. And all
those outcomes are Pareto efficient.
With the apparent experimental success of the BCCM the non-binary Conditional Con-
tribution Mechanism should be tested soon in a follow-up experiment. Thus, next tests
should focus on non-binary and/or non-linear environments. Considering the intuitive
appeal and simplicity of the message space the Conditional Contribution Mechanisms
are further suited to be tested in field experiments.
The BCCM is a new mechanism for public good provision that satisfies individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility. Furthermore, the mechanism is, compared to many
other existing mechanisms, rather simple. With the success of the BCCM in this exper-
imental study it becomes a candidate to finally solve the free-rider problem in a fitting
class of public good environments.
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Appendix B
This Appendix covers the experiment instructions. They are translations from the Ger-
man original. The German version can be obtained on request from the author. The
different instructions for the four treatments are given in the following order: 1.) VCM,
complete information, 2.) CCM, complete information, 3.) VCM, incomplete informa-
tion 4.) CCM, incomplete information.
Instructions for VCM with complete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private
account, or will be invested entirely into a common project. For every player who
invests his 10 points into the project all players obtain 6 points.
Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other players invested into
the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the investment of the
other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3×6 = 18 points in total added to your
account.
Example 2: You do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2 players invested into
the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally 6 points each
for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2× 6 = 22 points in total
added to your account.
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Every player can choose in every period between two actions:
 You can invest your 10 points into the project.
 Or you can keep your 10 points for yourself.
All players decide simultaneously.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you select an action for every player the computer will
calculate the payoff you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the action that will be relevant for your payoff. Below
there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave
the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock
on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the
time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the actions of all players of all previous periods and your payoff in
those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first period this block will
be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
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Instructions for CCM with complete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private
account, or will be invested entirely into a common project. For every player who
invests his 10 points into the project all players obtain 6 points.
Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other players invested into
the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the investment of the
other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3×6 = 18 points in total added to your
account.
Example 2: You do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2 players invested into
the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally 6 points each
for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2× 6 = 22 points in total
added to your account.
Every player can choose in every period between six different conditions:
 0=Contribute in any case.
 1=Contribute only if at least one other player contributes, too.
 2=Contribute only if at least two other players contribute, too.
 3=Contribute only if at least three other players contribute, too.
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 4=Contribute only if all four other players contribute, too.
 5=Contribute in no case.
The computer selects the highest amount of players, which can contribute to the project,
without violation the condition of any player. These players will then automatically
contribute to the project. The other players will not contribute.
Example 1: 3 players choose condition ”1” and the other two players choose condition
”5”. Then those 3 players, who chose condition ”1” will contribute to the project.
Example 2: 3 players choose condition ”3” and the other two players choose condition
”5”. Then no player will contribute to the project.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test conditions
for you and the four other players. Once you select a condition for every player the
computer will calculate the payoff you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the condition that will be relevant for your payoff.
Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and
leave the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A
clock on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If
the time runs out this has no effect.
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From period two on the conditions of all players of all previous periods and your payoff
in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first period this block
will be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
Instructions for VCM with incomplete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private
account, or will be invested entirely into a common project.
At the beginning of the first period every player will be assigned one type, which he
will keep for the entire game.
With a chance of 20% you are type 1 and you do not benefit from the common project.
In this case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account if you do
not invest them into the project. And 0 points will be added to your private account if
you invest into the project. If any other players invest into the project does not influence
your payoff in this case.
With a chance of 80% you are type 2 and you benefit from the common project. In this
case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account as well if you
do not invest them into the project, but 6 points will be added to your private account
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if you invest into the project. Additionally you receive 6 points for every other player,
who also invests into the project.
The types are drawn independently, especially different players may thus have different
types. Every player gets displayed his type in every period. He does not get to know
the types of the other players.
Example 1: You are type 2 and you invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other
players invested into the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for
the investment of the other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points
in total added to your account.
Example 2: You are type 2 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project
and 2 players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and
get additionally 6 points each for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get
10 + 2× 6 = 22 points in total added to your account.
Example 3: You are type 1 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and
2 players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get no
additional points for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 points in
total added to your account.
Every player can choose in every period between two actions:
 You can invest your 10 points into the project.
 Or you can keep your 10 points for yourself.
All players decide simultaneously.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
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If you are type 1 you will receive 5¤ additionally to compensate for your lower earning
possibilities.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you select an action for every player the computer will
calculate the payoff you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the action that will be relevant for your payoff.
Additionally in this block your type is displayed and whether you benefit from the
project. Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your
decision and leave the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment
continues. A clock on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should
be made. If the time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the actions of all players of all previous periods and your payoff in
those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first period this block will
be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
Instructions for CCM with incomplete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
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is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private
account, or will be invested entirely into a common project.
At the beginning of the first period every player will be assigned one type, which he
will keep for the entire game.
With a chance of 20% you are type 1 and you do not benefit from the common project.
In this case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account if you do
not invest them into the project. And 0 points will be added to your private account if
you invest into the project. If any other players invest into the project does not influence
your payoff in this case.
With a chance of 80% you are type 2 and you benefit from the common project. In this
case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account as well if you
do not invest them into the project, but 6 points will be added to your private account
if you invest into the project. Additionally you receive 6 points for every other player,
who also invests into the project.
The types are drawn independently, especially different players may thus have different
types. Every player gets displayed his type in every period. He does not get to know
the types of the other players.
Example 1: You are type 2 and you invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other
players invested into the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for
the investment of the other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points
in total added to your account.
Example 2: You are type 2 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project
and 2 players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and
get additionally 6 points each for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get
10 + 2× 6 = 22 points in total added to your account.
Example 3: You are type 1 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and
2 players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get no
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additional points for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 points in
total added to your account.
Every player can choose in every period between six different conditions:
 0=Contribute in any case.
 1=Contribute only if at least one other player contributes, too.
 2=Contribute only if at least two other players contribute, too.
 3=Contribute only if at least three other players contribute, too.
 4=Contribute only if all four other players contribute, too.
 5=Contribute in no case.
The computer selects the highest amount of players, which can contribute to the project,
without violation the condition of any player. These players will then automatically
contribute to the project. The other players will not contribute.
Example 1: 3 players choose condition ”1” and the other two players choose condition
”5”. Then those 3 players, who chose condition ”1” will contribute to the project.
Example 2: 3 players choose condition ”3” and the other two players choose condition
”5”. Then no player will contribute to the project.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
If you are type 1 you will receive 5¤ additionally to compensate for your lower earning
possibilities.
Program structure
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You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test conditions
for you and the four other players. Once you select a condition for every player the
computer will calculate the payoff you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the condition that will be relevant for your payoff.
Additionally in this block your type is displayed and whether you benefit from the
project. Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your
decision and leave the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment
continues. A clock on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should
be made. If the time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the conditions of all players of all previous periods and your payoff
in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first period this block
will be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
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Appendix C
In addition to instructions subjects had to fill out a slide of comprehension questions.
A translation of the German original is given exemplary for the case of the CCM and
incomplete information:
Comprehension questions - Experiment PGCCM
You are asked to complete two test questions to check whether you understood the
instructions completely.
Choose in the following test question 1 a condition for each player. Choose at least
three different conditions:
Your condition (player 1):
Condition player 2:
Condition player 3:
Condition player 4:
Condition player 5:
Underline those players, who would contribute to the project in this case:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
What payoff would you obtain in this period if you are of type 2?
Choose also in the following test question 2 a condition for each player. Choose at least
three different conditions, such that the number of players, who contribute to the
project, differs in test question 1 and 2:
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Your condition (player 1):
Condition player 2:
Condition player 3:
Condition player 4:
Condition player 5:
Underline those players, who would contribute to the project in this case:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
What payoff would you obtain in this period if you are of type 1?
Chapter 3
The non-binary Conditional
Contribution Mechanism for
public good provision.
An Experimental Study *
Abstract
There is still no general solution to the free-rider problem in public good environments. The Con-
ditional Contribution Mechanisms were developed recently as an attempt to solve the problem in
repeated public good environments. In a first experiment the Binary Conditional Contribution
Mechanism lead to higher contribution rates than the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, when
contribution is binary. In this paper we compare the Conditional Contribution Mechanism to
the VCM in a non-binary contribution environment. Additionally we compare both mechanisms
to a theoretically flawed but simpler version of the Conditional Contribution Mechanism.
*I thank Jo¨rg Oechssler, Peter Du¨rsch, Florian Kauffeld, Hannes Koppel, Christoph Brunner, Jonas
Hedlund and Christoph Vanberg as well as all participants of the seminars at Heidelberg University for
helpful comments.
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3.1 Introduction
When public goods are subject to voluntary contribution the incentive structure leads
to the well known free-rider problem. A new class of mechanisms, the Conditional
Contribution Mechanisms (CCMs), has recently been developed by Reischmann (2015a)
as a new attempt to solve this problem in repeated public good environments. The idea
of the CCMs is to give agents the possibility to condition their contribution towards
the public good on a certain total level of contribution provided by all agents. The
mechanism the selects the outcome with the highest total level of contributions that is
consistent with all these offers.
In repeated public good environments Better Response Dynamics are a good description
of subject behavior (Healy, 2006). Two specific dynamic properties make conditional
contribution offers work well under such a better response behavior. First, when con-
tributions to the public good in the current outcome are too low, subjects can choose
a cooperative conditional contribution offer without being myopically worse off. In this
way inefficient outcomes can be left towards more efficient outcomes under Better Re-
sponse Dynamics. Second, when contributions in the current outcome have reached an
efficient level, subjects can condition their contribution on the current level and thus re-
move any incentives to free-ride on others’ contributions. Therefore, efficient outcomes
can be stabilized under Better Response Dynamics. Indeed, under a new variant of
Better Response Dynamics introduced in Reischmann (2015a) the CCMs lead only to
Pareto efficient outcomes in the long run.
The first experiment with the CCM covered an environment in which contributions are
binary (Reischmann, 2015b). In this experiment contribution rates under the binary
CCM significantly exceeded contribution rates of the binary Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism (VCM) in the later periods. Furthermore, all groups that converged to some
outcome under the CCM converged to a Pareto optimal outcome as predicted by the
theory.
This paper covers a follow up experiment that tests the CCM in a non-binary contri-
bution environment. In the non-binary version of the CCM all subjects have to offer
two (not necessarily different) amounts to contribute to the public good. Both amounts
can be coupled with a condition on total contribution. Thus, any contribution offer is
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only invested into the public good if the corresponding condition can be met. The CCM
would be simpler and easier to understand if agents only had to choose one contribution
offer and one condition. However, Reischmann (2015a) shows that this mechanism can
trap the dynamics on outcomes that are not Pareto optimal. This leads to two ques-
tions that this experiment intends to answer. First, can the CCMs significantly increase
contributions to public goods compared to the VCM in a non-binary contribution envi-
ronment, as well? Second, do agents really get trapped in not Pareto optimal outcomes
in the simpler version of the mechanism as theory predicts?
Therefore, I compare three mechanisms in a standard linear public goods environment:
the standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), the non-binary Conditional
Contribution Mechanism (CCM), and the Single Conditional Contribution Mechanism
(SCCM) in which only one conditional contribution offer is announced. All mechanisms
are played in groups of 5 agents with a homogeneous and linear valuation for the public
good. The mechanisms are repeated over 40 periods to give enough time for the dynamic
adjustment behavior to converge to an equilibrium. The VCM is chosen as a benchmark
since it is the one mechanism that is used most often in real world applications. Thus,
finding a mechanism that is simple enough to be applicable in real public good envi-
ronments and that improves on the performance of the VCM is still one of the most
important goals in the research on public goods.
This experiment has two main findings. First the CCMs increase contributions signif-
icantly compared to the VCM in periods in which coordination under the CCMs does
not fail. Second, coordination fails in almost one in four periods. If those periods are
taken into account the CCMs do not lead to a significant increase in contributions.
Thus, an improvement in coordination might make the CCMs an option to solve the
free-rider problem for repeated non-binary contribution environments. Therefore, the
last section of this paper discusses three possible ways to improve coordination without
compromising the incentive structure of the CCMs.
3.1.1 Related literature
The related literature can be clustered into three different branches. First, this paper
relates to previous work on the CCMs. The CCMs were first introduced in Reischmann
(2015a) as a set of mechanisms for repeated public good environments. Reischmann
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(2015a) further introduces and motivates a new variant of Better Response Dynamics
as solution concept for the theoretical analysis of the CCMs. Under this new solution
concept all stable outcomes of the CCMs are Pareto efficient. In the following first
experiment on the CCMs Reischmann (2015b) tested the mechanisms in a binary con-
tribution environment once under perfect and once under imperfect information. In
both treatments the CCM lead to significantly higher contribution rates in the long run.
Furthermore, all long term stable outcomes were in line with the prediction of UBRD.
Second, there are studies on subject behavior in public good environments that are an
important motivation for the CCMs. On the one hand there are the experiments from
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Kocher et al. (2008). Both papers show experimentally
that there is a significant share of subjects that strictly prefers conditional cooperation
over free-riding in public good environments. Nevertheless the good dynamic properties
of the theoretical analysis of the CCM hold already under the assumption of selfish
agents. Therefore, preferences for conditional cooperation strengthen the argument that
the CCM has a rather simple and intuitive message space. Further there is the study
of Healy (2006), who finds that Better Response Dynamics explains subject behavior in
many public good experiments. This supports the dynamic model used in the theoretical
analysis of the CCMs.
Third, there is the branch of the literature that experimentally compares different mech-
anisms for public good provision. Examples are the studies by Smith (1979), Smith
(1980) and Banks et al. (1988), who compare the VCM to the auction mechanism of
Smith. Rondeau et al. (1999), Rose et al. (2002) and Rondeau et al. (2005) further test
the performance of the VCM against a Provision Point Mechanism. And very recently
Morgan and Sefton (2000), Schram and Onderstal (2009), and Corazzini et al. (2010)
compare auction and lottery mechanisms to the VCM.
3.1.2 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical
environment as well as the mechanisms that will be compared in the experiment. In
section 3.3 I give a short review of the theoretical predictions of the mechanisms for
the given environment. Section 3.4 motivates and presents the experimental design,
while section 3.5 presents the results. In section 3.6 I discuss possible ways to improve
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performance of the tested mechanisms on a theoretical level. Section 3.7 gives a summary
and discussion of the paper. Translations of the German instructions and test questions
handed out to subjects can be found in Appendix D and E.
3.2 Environment and mechanisms
In this section I give a short introduction to the public good environment that we use
in this experiment and the mechanisms that are subject of this experimental study.
For an extensive motivation and the thorough theoretical analysis of the Conditional
Contribution Mechanisms in more general environments see Reischmann (2015a).
I consider an environment with one private good x and one public good z. In this
environment n = 5 subjects interact repeatedly and have a constant endowment of
w = 20 in each period. There is no transfer of money from one period to the next
so the entire endowment has to be spent on either the private or the public good in
each period. I characterize an outcome in any period in this economy as a vector
z = (z1, . . . , zn), where zi describes the contribution of subject i to the public good.
For notational convenience define z = (0, . . . , 0). The payoff functions of all subjects are
linearly increasing in the level of the public good.
Πi(z) = 20− zi + θi
5∑
j=1
zj (3.1)
Here θi is the valuation of agent i for the public good. In the experiment a valuation of
θi = 0.4 is chosen for all subjects.
There are three treatments that differ in the mechanism which is used to allocate the
resources between the public and the private good. In the reference treatment sub-
jects allocate their endowment via the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). This
means all subjects choose individually and simultaneously how much of their endowment
they invest into the public good.
Both other treatments cover versions of the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM).
The main treatment covers the CCM as described in Reischmann (2015a). Here all sub-
jects announce two statements of the form ”I am willing to contribute an amount α to
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the public good, if total contributions are at least β”. The mechanism checks all those
statements and implements of all outcomes z, which satisfy all those conditions, the one
with the highest total level of contribution. This can be formalized in the following way.
Describe the message of subject i as mi = (α
1
i , β
1
i , α
2
i , β
2
i ). The set of outcomes which
satisfy all conditions can be described by ZCCM :
z ∈ ZCCM (m)⇔ zi = 0 or
∃li ∈ {1, 2} : zi = αlii and
n∑
j=1
zj ≥ βlii
 , ∀ i ∈ I (3.2)
Of all those outcomes the outcome function gCCM of the CCM selects the uniquely
defined outcome with the highest level of total contributions.
gCCM (m) = argmaxz∈ZCCM (m)
n∑
i=1
zi. (3.3)
This definition of the CCM seems to be unnecessarily complicated. Why announce
two conditional contribution statements? Does not one do the trick? One can indeed
define the mechanism in which only one such statement is announced and I will test
this mechanism in this study as well. I call it here the Single Conditional Contribution
Mechanism (SCCM).1
From a static perspective the equilibrium outcomes do not change at all when only
one message is announced. However, under dynamic considerations the CCM in this
form has a substantial advantage over the SCCM from a theoretical perspective as will
be shown in the next section. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the CCM and
the SCCM. The SCCM has the advantage of simplicity, which may make coordination
easier. The CCM grants higher flexibility, which makes deviations that have the aim to
improve contributions in the long run less costly. Which effect is more important will
be the second focus of this study.
1In Reischmann (2015a) this mechanism was called the Natural Extension Mechanism
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3.3 Theoretical predictions
This section covers the theoretical predictions of the CCM and SCCM as well as the
expectations of the VCM. I discuss Nash equilibrium as a static solution concept and
Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) as a dynamic solution concept. All
theoretical claims are illustrated by examples. The corresponding theorems, proofs, and
the motivation of the solution concept UBRD can be found in (Reischmann, 2015a). Here
I just define UBRD before discussing the theoretical predictions of the three mechanisms.
UBRD combines two behavioral assumptions into one model. First subjects are assumed
to better respond. I.e. subjects do not switch from their message mti in period t to a
message mt+1i in period t+ 1 if m
t+1
i makes agent i worse off if all other subjects repeat
what they did in period t.
Second subjects are assumed not to deviate to messages that can be exploited by other
agents. This reflects the assumption that each subject takes the possibilities for devia-
tions of other agents into account when choosing his message. And he rejects messages
that set incentives for other agents to free-ride on his contributions. In this sense a
message mt+1i is exploitable if there is any message profile m
t+1
−i such that agent i has to
contribute in the outcome of mt+1, but is worse off than in the current outcome under
mt. The formal definition of ”exploitable” is given in the following way.
Definition 3.1. Given a message profile m and an outcome g(m) = z, a deviation from
mi to m
′
i is called exploitable if there exists a message profile m−i ∈ M−i such that
z′(m−i) := g(m′i,m−i) ≺i z and z′i(m−i) > 0. A message m′i is called unexploitable, if it
is not exploitable.
This results in the following formal model of UBRD.
Definition 3.2. In Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) all agents can
adjust their message in every period. Agent i switches in period t to message mti with
strictly positive probability if and only if
 mti is a (weak) better response to m
t−1 and
 mti is unexploitable with respect to z
t−1 := g(mt−1).
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The intention of this model is the correct prediction of the long term stable outcomes of
the CCMs. The model is not intended to perfectly describe subjects behavior in every
period. I will apply this model to the three mechanisms in the next subsections.
3.3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Under the assumptions on preferences in this paper free-riding is a strictly dominant
strategy for all subjects in the VCM. This implies that there is only one Nash equilibrium.
In this Nash equilibrium nobody contributes anything to the public good. Further, free-
riding is the only unexploitable better response for any player in any period. Therefore,
the dynamic prediction is the same as the static prediction in this case.
However, previous experiments find consistently that contributions in the first period
of repeated public good games are about in the middle between the free-rider and the
Pareto efficient quantity. Then those contributions decline over time. See Ledyard
(1994) for a survey of this literature. Since those findings are persistent this is also the
expectation of the results for the VCM in this experiment.
3.3.2 Single Conditional Contribution Mechanism
The Nash equilibrium outcomes of the SCCM are all outcomes that are (weak) Pareto
improvements over z. Such an outcome z can be implemented as Nash equilibrium by
letting all subjects offer an individual contribution of zi under the condition that total
contributions are at least
∑n
j=1 zj . Nobody can benefit individually by deviating from
this message profile. This implies that there are multiple efficient as well as inefficient
equilibria.
Under UBRD there are many inefficient outcomes of stable states as well. In fact every
outcome that is a strict Pareto improvement over z is an outcome of a stable state of
the dynamics. The following example demonstrates this.
Example 3.1. Consider the experimental environment of n = 5 subjects with an en-
dowment of w = 20. Assume that in the current period all subjects send the message
mi = (10, 50). Therefore, all subjects offer to contribute 10 if total contributions are
at least 50. This leads to the outcome z = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10), which is a strict Pareto
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improvement over z. Assume now that subject 1 wants to deviate. If subject 1 reduces
his contribution offer to anything lower than 10 the conditions of subjects 2 to 5 will
be violated and they will no longer contribute anything to the public good. Therefore,
this is not a better response for subject 1. If subject 1 increases his contribution offer
while keeping his condition fulfilled he increases his own contribution without altering
the contribution of anyone else. This makes him worse off as well. If subject 1 increases
his contribution combined with a condition that can not be satisfied, the outcome will
be z. All remaining messages offer a contribution of 10. However, if this is combined
with any condition larger than 50 the outcome is again z. And if it is combined with
a condition smaller than 50 the message is exploitable. Therefore mi = (10, 50) is the
only unexploitable better response. Thus, this is one example of steady state of UBRD,
in which the outcome is not Pareto optimal.
In the same way as in the example subjects can get trapped in a steady state with any
other outcome that is a strict Pareto improvement over z. Of course if subjects realize
the potential long term gains it might be reasonable for them to break such steady states
and accept the short term loss. This would lead to only efficient steady states and then
the SCCM should be preferred over the CCM for its simplicity. However, whether this
would actually happen is an empirical question. Therefore, the SCCM is included as a
treatment in this study to answer this question.
3.3.3 Conditional Contribution Mechanism
The CCM has exactly the same Nash equilibrium outcomes as the SCCM. Therefore
the two mechanisms do not differ at all with respect to static equilibrium properties.
However, with respect to dynamic equilibrium properties there is a significant difference.
Under UBRD all outcomes of recurrent classes of the CCM are Pareto efficient and strict
Pareto improvements over z. The reason for this result is that in the CCM any outcome
that is not Pareto efficient can be left towards Pareto improvements in line with UBRD.
This can be illustrated by using a similar example as above.
Example 3.2. Assume that in the experimental environment all 5 subjects currently
offer to contribute 10 if and only if total contributions are at least 50. This corresponds
to messages mi = (10, 50, 10, 50) for all agents. Now assume agent 1 deviates to the
Chapter 3. CCM vs.VCM - An experiment with non-binary contribution 63
message m′1 = (10, 50, 20, 100). This deviation does not change the outcome, therefore
it is a better response. Further if the second condition should actually be satisfied total
contributions would increase from 50 to 100 making subject 1 better off even though
he has to contribute more. Thus, m′i is unexploitable. However, if all subjects switch
to m′i = (10, 50, 20, 100) the outcome will switch from z = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10) to z
′ =
(20, 20, 20, 20, 20) and all subjects will be strictly better off.
Therefore, the theoretical prediction for the CCMs is that the agents will reach some
stable state eventually. In case of the SCCM it will depend on the ability of subjects to
evaluate the trade off between long term and short term gains if those outcomes will be
Pareto efficient. In case of the CCM those outcomes should always be Pareto efficient.
In previous experiments with the binary version of the CCM the model of UBRD already
predicted the long term stable outcomes correctly (Reischmann, 2015b).
3.4 Experimental design
These experiments were designed to answer the following two questions. Do the Condi-
tional Contribution Mechanisms lead to more efficient contributions than the VCM in
the selected environment? Are the better theoretical dynamic properties of the CCM
more important than the simplicity of the SCCM?
In the experiment 110 subjects were randomly grouped in 22 groups of 5 people. All
groups stayed together for the entire experiment. Each group played a public good game
with one of the three mechanisms. Eight groups played the SCCM, seven groups played
the VCM, and seven groups played the CCM. The stage game mechanism was repeated
over 40 periods. 40 periods were chosen since already in the experiments on the BCCM
about 10 periods were needed to achieve coordination on stable outcomes. Since the
CCM is significantly more complicated it is reasonable to assume that convergence will
take longer. 40 periods should be long enough to observe whether convergence does take
place.
All experiments were conducted at the experimental lab of the Alfred-Weber Institute
of Heidelberg University. At the beginning of the experiments subjects were randomly
placed inside the lab and handed out instructions and test questions. The experiments
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were conducted in German. English translations of the instructions and test questions
can be found in Appendix D and E. In the test questions subjects are asked to choose
messages for the corresponding mechanism for 5 subjects and then calculate the mech-
anism outcome by hand. In the case of the CCM a hint for a fast way to calculate the
outcome was given on the sheet. Once all subjects solved the test question correctly and
there were no more questions the experiment started.
The experiment was programmed in the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In each
period subjects were asked to enter their message. They further had access to a calculator
in which they could enter messages for all subjects and let the calculator determine their
contribution as well as their payoff in this case. From period two onwards subjects were
displayed a history that contains the messages of all subjects of previous rounds as well
as their own payoff in this period.
After the 40 periods were finished subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire
asking for personal characteristics such as prior knowledge of game theory. Once all
subjects finished the questionnaire they were paid their earnings in private and in cash.
The experiments lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and subjects earned on average
12.33¤.
3.5 Experimental results
The analysis of the experimental data focuses on two different aspects. First, whether
or not average contribution rates in groups are significantly different in the three mecha-
nism. And second, whether or not the dynamic predictions of UBRD can be observed in
the data of the experiments on the CCMs. In particular, do the bad dynamic properties
of the SCCM lead to suboptimal stable outcomes as predicted by the model UBRD?
And are all long term stable outcomes under the CCM Pareto efficient?
3.5.1 Contribution rates
I want to start with the simple observation that the experimental data with respect
to the VCM is in line with previous findings in the experimental literature. Average
contributions in period 1 are 68% and contributions decline over time. The decline is
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estimated by a Matched-pairs Wilcoxon-Ranksum Test comparing average contributions
over periods 1 to 20 with those from period 21 to 40 for each group. This leads to a
p-value of 0.018.
The most important question that this study answers is concerning the comparison of
contribution rates between the three mechanisms. Therefore, I look at average contribu-
tion rates over either all periods, the last 20 periods, or the last 10 periods in all groups.
The second and third analysis has the intention of comparing contribution rates once
a certain level of dynamic adjustments took place. I compare these averages between
each set of two mechanisms with a Wilcoxon-Ranksum Test. Contribution rates for the
CCM and for the SCCM are lower in the beginning, but higher in the last 20 and 10
periods than in the VCM as can be seen in figure 3.1. However, it turns out that non of
those differences are statistically significant (all p-values higher than 0.1). This implies
that there is no statistically significant difference in actual contributions.
Result 3.3. There are no significant differences in average contribution rates between
the three mechanisms.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of average contributions over all groups
The main reason for these insignificant results is that, while the contribution offers are
higher, the CCMs suffer from a lack of coordination in many periods. In fact in about
24% of periods actual contribution is zero although contribution offers are similar to all
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other periods, because no coordination of offers and conditions was accheived. This hints
to the fact that contribution rates in the CCMs might be significantly higher than in the
VCM in those periods in which contribution does not fail. This is indeed true for the
SCCM in the later periods. I compare the contribution rates between the SCCM and the
VCM and evaluate for the SCCM only periods in which total contribution is bigger than
zero. Then average contributions are significantly higher in the SCCM than the VCM
in the last 20 (p=0.08) and the last 10 periods (p=0.08). However, the same analysis
comparing the CCM with the VCM does not lead to significant results. A closer look at
individual groups playing the CCM shows that subjects don’t manage to improve as a
group. The reason for this might be that choosing a strategically good better response
becomes too difficult when faced with a total of eight conditional contribution offers of
the other four players.
Result 3.4. In periods in which coordination does not fail entirely only the SCCM leads
to significantly higher contribution rates than the VCM in the last 20 and the last 10
periods.
Of course this comparison is somewhat unfair and in no way an argument to use the
SCCM in its current form. However, these results show that the SCCM leads agents
to higher offers in general. And if we can find a way to improve coordination without
altering the incentive structure of the SCCM there is a good chance that this mechanism
can increase efficiency in repeated public good environments significantly.
3.5.2 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics
The second question of this paper concerns the dynamic solution model Unexploitable
Better Response Dynamics. This model was introduced in the theoretical analysis of
the CCMs (Reischmann, 2015a) and predicted the long term stable outcomes of the
binary CCM correctly in a previous experimental study (Reischmann, 2015b). For this
experiment UBRD makes the following predictions for the two mechanisms. All long
term stable outcomes under the CCM are Pareto optimal. All long term stable outcomes
in the SCCM are strict Pareto improvements over z.
Convergence must be defined in some way in the data to answer those questions ex-
perimentally. I say that a group ”converged to a stable outcome” if at least for of the
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last five outcomes are identical. With this definition five out of the 15 groups that use
one of the two versions of the CCM converged to some outcome, three groups for the
SCCM and two groups four the CCM. In the three groups with the SCCM as well as one
group with the CCM this outcome is the most efficient Pareto optimal outcome. And
in one remaining group with the CCM this outcome is z. In the last group contribution
offers are quite high, but in the last four periods coordination fails entirely and actual
contributions are zero in those four periods.
These observations show two results. First, in about one in four groups subjects manage
to coordinate for multiple periods on a Pareto optimal outcome. This indicates the
UBRD predicts correctly that those outcomes are stable states of the mechanisms.
Result 3.5. Pareto efficient outcomes are stable states of the CCMs as predicted by the
model UBRD.
Second, groups do not get stuck on any inefficient outcomes that are stable states of
UBRD. However, in at least one group we observe that subjects deliberately choose to
break coordination in order to coordinate on a more efficient long term outcome. This
accounts for some of the periods in which coordination fails in the SCCM.
Result 3.6. There is no support for the prediction of UBRD that the SCCM has also
inefficient stable outcomes.
3.5.3 Summary
Of the two CCMs tested in this experimental study the SCCM seems to be more promis-
ing. It leads to significantly higher contribution rates than the VCM in those periods
in which coordination does not fail. Thus, finding ways to improve coordination in the
SCCM can be one next step in the research on CCMs. I present some ideas on this
matter in the next section.
3.6 Three ways to improve coordination
The experimental results demonstrate that the main issue of the SCCM is a coordination
problem. Therefore, I conclude this paper by proposing three different possibilities to
facilitate coordination.
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3.6.1 Possibility I: Use communication
The first possibility to improve coordination is the introduction of communication. This
is certainly the most simple way to improve coordination, whenever it is applicable. Al-
ready in experiments with the VCM subjects have been shown to achieve more efficient
contribution rates when communication is possible (Isaac et al., 1985). Since communi-
cation in such an environment does not change the incentive structure of the mechanisms
this increase in contributions can not be related to coordination in the VCM. However,
communication in form of promises can be more than cheap talk. As Vanberg (2008)
suggests subjects may have direct preferences for promise keeping.
However, in the SCCM it does not even matter if subjects have preferences for keeping
their promise. Once subjects manage to coordinate on a certain outcome by means of
communication nobody has an incentive to deviate from that agreement. He would just
violate the conditions of everyone else leading to a break down of cooperation. Therefore,
we can expect communication to have an even more positive effect on the SCCM than
on the VCM.
However, there are two reasons that make communication less appealing. The first reason
is that communication in real applications is often costly. Sometimes with regards to
monetary costs, but almost always with regards to costs in terms of time and effort.
The second reason is that communication is just not always practicable. Especially
when groups get bigger communication between all participants might just be impossible.
Nevertheless, for small groups with low communication costs communication is certainly
an important option to facilitate coordination.
3.6.2 Possibility II: Use an extensive-form
The second possibility to improve coordination is to change the stage game to an ex-
tensive form game without changing the message spaces for any player. This has the
advantage that the players moving later in the game already know the conditions of
all previous players. However, there is the disadvantage that the game is no longer
symmetric and therefore the first mover has a significant advantage. However, when
subgame perfect equilibrium is considered as the natural solution concept the outcome
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will still be Pareto efficient. The structure of the equilibrium can easily be observed in
an example.
Example 3.3. Consider the experimental environment with n = 5 subjects, endowments
of w = 20, and valuations for the public good of θi = 0.4. For simplicity call the subject
that moves first subject 1 and the subject that moves last subject 5. Further assume that
whenever subjects are indifferent they choose the option that leads to higher contribution
levels.2 Then apply backward induction. Subject 5 knows all contribution offers and
conditions of all other subjects. Thus, he will simply choose of all contribution levels
the one that gives him the highest payoff. Importantly, if nobody chose to contribute
anything so far he will contribute zero as well. Therefore, he basically can choose between
satisfying the conditions of subjects 1 to 4 in the cheapest way or the outcome z. Subject
4 faces a similar problem. Since the combined benefit of subjects 4 and 5 is only θ4+θ5 =
0.8, there is no Pareto improvement over z0 if only subjects 4 and 5 contribute. Therefore
also subject 4 faces the trade off to either satisfy the conditions of all previous players,
anticipating the optimal contribution decision of subject 5, or the outcome z. Subject 3
finally faces a different choice. If he chooses not to satisfy the conditions of subject 1
and 2 he can choose the message m3 = (10, 50). This makes subjects 4 and 5 indifferent
between choosing m4/5 = (20, 50) and m4/5 = (0, 0). And we assumed that they would
choose the first option. Therefore, subject 3 can decide between the optimal way of
satisfying the conditions of 1 and 2 and the outcome z = (0, 0, 10, 20, 20) giving him
a payoff of 30. Thus subject 3 will only satisfy conditions of players 1 and 2 if this
leads to a payoff of at least 30. Subject 2 has no way of incentivizing player 3 on his
own to increase contributions even more, because subjects 4 and 5 already contribute
the maximum and valuations of subject 2 and 3 only add up to 0.8 again. This leaves
the decision of subject 1. The best he can offer is m1 = (5, 75). This makes subject 2
indifferent between m2 = (10, 75) and m2 = (0, 0) where he chooses the first one. This
makes subject 3 indifferent between m3 = (20, 75) and m3 = (10, 50) again choosing
the first one. Thus, on the equilibrium path in the subgame perfect equilibrium subjects
choose m∗ = (5, 75; 10, 75; 20, 75; 20, 75; 20, 75), with outcome z∗ = (5, 10, 20, 20, 20).
The example demonstrates the Pareto efficiency of the outcome as well as the first mover
2This assumption is not critical. Assuming that subjects instead choose the outcome with lower
contributions in case of indifference only reduces the first mover advantage to some extent.
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advantage in this structure. The mechanism can of course be made fair ex ante by hav-
ing a fair random draw over the order of players. However, this does not make this
mechanism fair ex post, which would be desirable. Further, as in the case of commu-
nication an extensive form game becomes more difficult to implement the more players
are participating in the mechanism. One way to go here might be to have an extensive
form game without a fixed order. E.g. such that players can commit to their messages
on an online platform and all players can inform themselves on all messages committed
so far at any given time.
3.6.3 Possibility III: Keep gains of previous coordination
The third possibility to improve coordination is to change the outcome generation of
the mechanism to a two stage process. The general idea is, that whenever coordination
fails the mechanism proposes a ”better” outcome which can get implemented if every-
one prefers it. Basically the mechanism coordinates your messages for you. Thus the
mechanism would calculate the standard outcome of the CCMs and then let agents vote
between this outcome and the proposed ”better” outcome. Only if all agents vote for
the ”better” outcome it gets implemented. Otherwise the outcome will be the standard
outcome as described in this paper.
However, there is one big problem with this approach. The mechanism needs to know
somehow what is a ”better” outcome without knowing subjects preferences. Therefore,
the only information that can be used in the stage game is the message profile sent
by agents. If the proposed alternate outcome depends on agents’ messages this sets
incentives to break coordination on purpose in a way that the most beneficial alternate
outcome gets proposed. Since breaking the coordination usually leads to z agents would
vote between z and some coordinated outcome that the deviator can influence. There-
fore, I can see no way to define a ”better” outcome depending on the message profile
that does not ruin the incentive structure of the mechanism.
Thus, this proposed alternate outcome cannot depend on the message profile, either.
In a one-shot game there is nothing left that can be used. However, in the repeated
settings that are considered to be suited for the CCMs there is the history of past play.
Thus, I propose to use the outcome of the last period as an alternate outcome. This
makes it possible, even in the simple SCCM, to choose your messages in an attempt
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to realize further Pareto improvements. And if this leads to a failure of coordination
the gains from previous periods can be saved by voting for this outcome. Since this
alternate outcome does not depend on any current message this change does not alter
the static incentive structure of the mechanism. And it even strengthens the argument
for unexploitable messages in the dynamic model.
3.7 Summary and discussion
The focus of this study is the experimental test of two versions of the Conditional
Contribution Mechanism (CCM) for public good provision. In one version, the Single
Conditional Contribution Mechanism (SCCM), agents announce one contribution of-
fer and one condition. In the second version agents announce two such pairs. Both
mechanisms are further compared to the performance of the Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism, which is still used in most applications for its simplicity.
The experimental study answers two questions. First, do the CCMs provide a more
efficient level of the public good than the VCM? The straight forward answer to this
question is no. Even if only the last 20 or the last 10 periods are taken into consid-
eration the difference in contribution rates is not significant. This implies that in the
tested environment the CCMs in the tested configuration do not improve the level of
contributions to public goods. The main reason for this failure is that in both CCMs
agents’ conditional contribution offers do not match well leading to a contribution of
zero in about 24% of all periods.
However, if we compare only contribution rates in periods in which coordination does
not fail entirely contributions in the SCCM are significantly higher than in the VCM.
This observation does not make the result of the SCCM any better, but it demonstrates
that there is a potential of significant improvements if the problem of coordination of
conditional contribution offers can be solved. Therefore, the last section of this study
offers three possible ways to improve coordination in the SCCM as a hint for future
research. In one shot environments coordination can be improved by adding communi-
cation, or changing the stage game to an extensive form game. If the environment is a
repeated public good setting I propose to vote after every period whether the outcome of
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the current message profile shall be implemented or whether the outcome of last period
shall be used. The outcome of the last period is only used if all players favor this option.
The second question that this study answers is whether or not the predictions of UBRD
can be observed in the data of the experiments on the CCMs. For the SCCM UBRD
predicts that if the mechanism reaches a stable outcome which is not Pareto efficient,
then this outcome will never be left. In the experiment this kind of behavior was
not observed. Either subjects did not coordinate on such an outcome at all or they
deliberately chose to leave it. This lead to short term losses but long term gains. Further,
more than one in four groups converge to the socially most desirable outcome. This
supports the prediction of UBRD that Pareto efficient outcomes are stable in the long
run.
Summing up, the Conditional Contribution Mechanisms did not directly outperform the
VCM in terms of contributions in this non-binary environment. The main problem of
the mechanisms is a failure in coordination that occurs in about one out of every four
periods. The main goal for future research on the CCMs must therefore be the search
for ways to improve coordination in a reliable way.
Appendix D
This Appendix covers the instructions of the experiments. They are translations from
the German original. The German version can be obtained on request from the author.
The different instructions for the three treatments are given in the following order: 1.)
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 2.) Single Conditional Contribution Mechanism 3.)
Conditional Contribution Mechanism.
Instructions for the VCM
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
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experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 40
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 20 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added directly to your private
account, or will be invested into a common project. For every point that is invested into
the project by any player all players obtain 0.4 points.
Example 1: You invest 15 points into the project and additionally 2 other players in-
vested 15 points each into the project. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 45× 0.4 = 18 points. Additionally you keep 5 of your
20 points. Thus, you will get 18 + 5 = 23 points in total added to your account.
Every player can choose in every period how many points he wants to invest into the
project. He can choose any natural number between 0 and 20.
All players decide simultaneously.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes how much to the project in a given period, all
players get the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 40 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods. For every point you will receive 0.01¤. The payment will be private
and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
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The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you selected an action for every player you can press
the button ”Calculate payoff!” and the computer will calculate the payoff you would
obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the action that will be relevant for your payoff. Below
there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave
the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock
on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the
time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the actions of all players of all previous periods and your payoff in
those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first period this block will
be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
Instructions for the SCCM
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 40
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 20 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added directly to your private
account, or will be invested into a common project. For every point that is invested into
the project by any player all players obtain 0.4 points.
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Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and additionally 2 other players
invested 5 points each into the project. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 20 × 0.4 = 8 points. The 10 points that you did not
invest are added directly to your account. Thus you get 8 + 10 = 18 points in total.
Example 2: You invest you 15 points into the project and additionally 2 other players
invested 15 points each into the project. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 45 × 0.4 = 18 points. The 5 points that you did not
invest are added directly to your account. Thus you get 18 + 5 = 23 points in total.
Every player can propose in every period a whole-number amount between 0 and 20
points that shall be invested into the project. Further there can be set a condition
for this contribution. This condition sets a total amount that has to be invested by
all players together (yourself included) into the project such that your contribution is
invested as well.
After all players simultaneously choose an amount and a condition, the computer calcu-
lates the highest amount possible, which can be invested into the project. Each player
will invest his proposed amount if and only if his condition makes it possible.
Example 1: You chose 5 points as potential amount. And 20 points as condition. This
is like saying: I am willing to invest 5 points into the project if total contributions to
the project are at least 20 points. If the other players chose amounts and conditions
such that the computer calculates a maximal possible contribution to the project of less
than 20 points you will not contribute to the project at all. If the computer calculates
an amount between 20 and 100 points you invest 5 points into the project.
Example 2: You chose 0 points as potential amount. And 0 points as condition. This is
like saying: I am willing to invest 0 points into the project if total contributions to the
project are at least 0 points. No matter what the other players choose in this case you
will not contribute to the project at all and keep your 20 points in your account.
Example 3: You chose 10 points as potential amount. And 10 points as condition. This
is like saying: I am willing to invest 10 points into the project if total contributions to
the project are at least 10 points. Since your proposed 10 points already satisfy your
own condition you will contribute in any case 10 points to the project, no matter how
much the other players invest.
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Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes how much to the project in a given period, all
players get the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 40 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at an exchange rate of 100 points = 1. The payment will be private
and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you selected an action for every player you can press
the button ”Calculate payoff!” and the computer will calculate the payoff you would
obtain in this case as well as the amount you will invest.
In the upper right block you enter your amount and your condition that will be relevant
for your payoff. Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your
decision and leave the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment
continues. A clock on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should
be made. If the time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the amounts and conditions of all players of all previous periods
and your payoff in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first
period this block will be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
Instructions for the CCM
Instructions
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Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned off until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 40
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or
what payoff any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 20 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added directly to your private
account, or will be invested into a common project. For every point that is invested into
the project by any player all players obtain 0.4 points.
Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and additionally 2 other players
invested 5 points each into the project. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 20 × 0.4 = 8 points. The 10 points that you did not
invest are added directly to your account. Thus you get 8 + 10 = 18 points in total.
Example 2: You invest you 15 points into the project and additionally 2 other players
invested 15 points each into the project. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 45 × 0.4 = 18 points. The 5 points that you did not
invest are added directly to your account. Thus you get 18 + 5 = 23 points in total.
Every player can propose in every period two whole-number amounts between 0 and 20
points that shall be invested into the project. Further there can be set a condition for
each amount. This condition sets a total amount that has to be invested by all players
together (yourself included) into the project such that each of your amounts is invested
as well.
After all players simultaneously choose two amounts and conditions, the computer cal-
culates the highest amount possible, which can be invested into the project. Each player
will invest at most one of his proposed amounts into the project. If his condition makes
it possible he invests the higher amount.
Example 1: You chose 5 and 15 points as potential amounts. And 20 and 60 points
as conditions. This is like saying: I am willing to invest 5 points into the project if
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total contributions to the project are at least 20 points. If total contributions are at
least 60 points I an willing to invest 15 points into the project. If the other players
chose amounts and conditions such that the computer calculates a maximal possible
contribution to the project of less than 20 points you will not contribute to the project
at all. If the computer calculates an amount between 20 and 59 points you invest 5
points into the project. And if the computer calculates an amount of 60 or more points
you will invest 15 points into the project.
Example 2: You chose 10 and 20 points as potential amount. And 10 and 100 points
as conditions. This is like saying: I am willing to invest 20 points into the project if
total contributions to the project are at least 100 points. If total contributions are less
than 100 points I will invest 10 points in any case into the project. If the other players
chose amounts and conditions such that the computer calculates a total amount of less
than 100 points you will invest 10 points into the project. If the computer calculates an
amount of 100 points you will invest 20 points into the project.
Example 3: You chose 0 and 0 points as potential amounts. And 0 and 0 points as
conditions. This is like saying: I am not willing at all to invest into the project. No
matter what amounts and conditions the other players choose in this case you will not
contribute to the project at all and keep your points in your account.
Payoff of all periods
After it was determined who contributes how much to the project in a given period, all
players get the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 40 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings
for all periods at an exchange rate of 100 points = 1. The payment will be private
and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
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The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test amounts and
conditions for you and the four other players. Once you selected amounts and conditions
for every player you can press the button ”Calculate payoff!” and the computer will
calculate the payoff you would obtain in this case as well as the amount you will invest.
In the upper right block you enter your amounts and your conditions that will be relevant
for your payoff. Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your
decision and leave the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment
continues. A clock on the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should
be made. If the time runs out this has no effect.
From period two on the amounts and conditions of all players of all previous periods
and your payoff in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the first
period this block will be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
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Appendix E
In addition to instructions subjects had to fill out a slide of comprehension questions.
A translation of the German original is given exemplary for the case of the SCCM:
Comprehension question - Experiment PGCCM
You are asked to complete a test questions to check whether you understood the instruc-
tions completely.
Choose in the following test question one amount and one condition for each player.
Choose at least three different amounts and conditions:
Your amount (player 1):
Your condition (player 1):
Amount player 2:
Condition player 2:
Amount player 3:
Condition player 3:
Amount player 4:
Condition player 4:
Amount player 5:
Condition player 5:
Underline those players, who would contribute to the project in this case:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
What are the total contributions that will be invested into the project in this case?
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What payoff would you obtain in this case in this period?
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